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Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to
Cyberspace
STEVEN G. GEY*
The public forum doctrine has been a fxture offree speech law since the
beginning of the modem era of First Amendment jurisprudence. The doctrine
serves several functions. It is a metaphorical reference point for the strong
protection of free speech everywhere, and it provides specific rules protecting
free speech in public places. In this Article, Professor Gey reviews the
development of the public forum doctrine. Professor Gey argues that serious
problems have developed within the doctrine in recent times due to the Supreme
Court's refusal to extend the fidl protection of the doctrine to new forwms that
do not resemble the parks and sidewalks of the traditional public forum cases.
Professor Gey then reviews Justice Kennedy's recent contributions to the
debate over the public forum doctrine, in which Justice Kennedy advocates
erpanding the protective scope of the doctrine. Professor Gey draws on
Kennedy's suggestions to propose a reinterpretation of public forum doctrine.
Under this reinterpretation, the First Amendment would protect speech in a
public space unless the speech would significantly interfere with the
government's noncommunicative activities in that space. Professor Gey also
argues that the reinterpreted doctrine should extend beyond physical spaces to
cover "metaphysical"forums, including any government property that provides
an instrunentalty of communication. In the final sections of the Article,
Professor Gey considers the application of his theory to two new,
"metaphysical" forums: government subsidy programs and government access
to the Internet.
In many respects, the story of the First Amendment is the story of the
public forum doctrine. The Supreme Court's classic statement of the public
forum doctrine in Hague v. C.1O.1 also captures the spirit of the First
Amendment generally: from "time out of mind" the Amendment has protected
"assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."2 Likewise, free speech-in public forums and elsewhere-has
"from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University.
1 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
2Id. at 515.
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liberties of citizens." 3 In a perfect world, the First Amendment would reflect
the same ideals as the hypothetically pure public forum described in Hague: a
strong presumption in favor of unfettered speech, an equally strong
presumption against government manipulation or control of debate and
discussion, and a built-in tolerance for boisterous and even offensive
expression.
Unfortunately, in recent years the strong protections offered by the public
forum doctrine have been limited to the most traditional of forums, such as
public parks and sidewalks. Outside these very traditional contexts, the Court
has been extremely reluctant to apply the same rigorous standards to protect the
quintessential First Amendment objectives of expressive openness and freedom
from government control. Thus, the Court has permitted the government to
limit or even exclude private speech from many publicly-owned venues that do
not fit precisely the traditional model of a park or a sidewalk, even if those
nontraditional venues are theoretically devoted to the dissemination of ideas.
Thus, the Court has permitted the government to restrict speech by limiting
access to residential mail boxes,4 public school inter-office mail systems,5
public areas in municipal airports, 6 advertising space in public transit systems,7
and publicly-owned billboards. 8
In these and hundreds of similar cases the Supreme Court and the lower
courts have employed the oxymoronic concept of a "limited" public forum to
describe forums that simultaneously are and are not public. The inconsistency
inherent in the limited public forum concept is compounded by the method used
by the Court to determine whether, and to what extent, the government has
opened a non-traditional forum. In assessing whether a public space is a limited
public forum, the courts typically attempt to ascertain the government's intent in
creating the forum. In other words, in a limited public forum case, which
inevitably involves a government attempt to bar some speaker from a
government-owned venue, the courts ask whether the government intended to
open the forum for this particular kind of discussion. Not surprisingly, the
answer is usually "no."
This approach is deeply inhospitable to speech in new or nontraditional
forums. Moreover, the courts' restrictive attitude in the limited public forum
31d.
4 See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981).
5 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
6 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. .Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
7 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
8 See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, amended on
denial of rehearing, 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996).
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cases has even begun to infect their treatment of traditional public forum cases.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has applied the logic of the limited public
forum doctrine to permit the government to restrict speech on public sidewalks
outside post offices, 9 public schools, 10 and polling places." In these cases the
Court holds that speech on public sidewalks may be prohibited if it is
"incompatible" with the government's chosen activity in the forum. 12
The speech-restrictive thrust of the Court's public forum decisions is
especially striking in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has otherwise been
relatively hospitable to First Amendment free speech claims in recent years.
During the same period in which the Court expanded the government's power
to control speech in public forums, the Court strongly reaffirmed the First
Amendment requirement of content-neutrality, 13 vigorously reiterated the need
to protect offensive or politically unpopular speech, 14 and even expanded First
Amendment protections in areas such as commercial speech. 15 Some of the
discussions in these speech-friendly cases suggest the possibility of heavily
revising the Court's recent public forum analysis in a way that would make that
analysis more compatible with the strong support for speech that is evident
among a majority of the Court's members.
This Article reviews the Court's current public forum doctrine and suggests
various ways in which that doctrine could be revised to make it more speech-
protective. These modifications will bring the doctrine into line with the
generally protective spirit of the Court's modem First Amendment analysis,
and will also provide an analytical framework for dealing with two of the more
vexing "new forum" problems confronting the courts recently: the problem
posed by content restrictions on government subsidies of expression and
problems arising from the regulation of new communication technologies such
as the Internet.
The first section of this Article reviews the evolution of the current public
forum doctrine, especially with regard to its application in the limited public
forum cases. The second section addresses several recent opinions casting doubt
9 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
10 See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
11 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
12 See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 ("The crucial question is whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time.").
13 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
14 See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (protecting dial-a-
porn services); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protecting flag burning); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (protecting salacious satire).
15 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
19981 1537
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
upon the existing doctrine, and suggests several ways in which the current
doctrine could be modified-especially by abandoning both the limited public
forum analysis and the emphasis on government intent that has become a
central focus of the limited public forum cases. The third section applies the
revised public forum analysis to three typical nontraditional forum scenarios:
regulation of expressive access to government property other than parks and
sidewalks, restrictions on controversial advertisements in publicly owned
facilities, and regulation of speech in public schools. The fourth and fifth
sections apply the proposed revised public forum doctrine to two new forums.
The fourth section applies the revised public forum doctrine to the problems
presented by content-restrictive government subsidies for speech. The fifth
section applies the revised doctrine to recent government efforts to regulate the
Internet. The fifth section also addresses the public forum implications of the
Supreme Court's recent Internet-regulation decision in Reno v. ACLU.16
I. THE ONLY-PARTLY-PuBLIc FORUM DOCTINE
The public forum doctrine has a noble heritage. It derives from the most
basic mythological image of free speech: an agitated but eloquent speaker
standing on a soap box at Speakers' Comer, railing against injustices committed
by the government, whose agents are powerless to keep the audience from
hearing the speaker's damning words. According to the noble myth of the
public forum, protecting such speakers is essential to preserving a Western
democratic culture, because democracy can only flourish if citizens are free to
speak Truth to Power.
It is an inspiring, but antiquated and somewhat inaccurate image. For one
thing, the reality never really fit the noble myth: speakers on street comers have
rarely been as concerned with communicating Truth as they have been focused
on winning converts or motivating those who are already converted. More
importantly, the street comer has long since ceased to be a focal point of either
truth-telling or instigating the dissatisfied masses. Modem visitors to the real
Speakers' Comer in London's Hyde Park will find little more than a motley
collection of eccentrics playing to an audience composed largely of tourists, few
of whom care a whit about the local political issues of the moment.
Although the dynamics of real public forums may never have been as pure
and honorable as the myth, the essential reality grasped by the public forum
concept remains as valid today as it was when thousands of Socialists packed
into Union Square in the early days of this century to hang on every word of
great progressive orators such as Eugene Debs. The larger reality behind the
myth of the debate on the public street-corner is that every culture must have
16 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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venues in which citizens can confront each other's ideas and ways of thinking
about the world. Without such a place, a pluralistic culture inevitably becomes
Balkanized into factions that not only cannot come to agreement about the
Common Good, but also will not even know enough about other subcultures
within the society to engage effectively in the deal-making and horse-trading
that is the key to every modem manifestation of democratic government. If the
public forum is a myth, it is a myth that is indispensable to democracy, and
certainly indispensable to a democracy defined by a constitution such as ours, in
which free speech and expression are essential components of our political self-
definition. The question, therefore, is why, having recognized the critical
importance of public forums to our political culture, has the Supreme Court
limited the protections offered by the public forum doctrine to types of
forums-i.e., parks and sidewalks-whose importance as places for serious
discussion of public issues faded long ago?
A. Opening the Public Forum
The public forum doctrine arose from the Supreme Court's rejection of the
view that the government could regulate the use of its property in the same
ways and to the same extent as a private property owner. This view, drawn
from the common law and articulated most eloquently by Oliver Wendell
Holmes in the years before he became a hero of free speech proponents, 17
would dominate the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the subject until the
1930s. Then, in the Hague'8 decision, the Supreme Court renounced the near-
total deference to state prerogatives inherent in the earlier cases in favor of
comprehensive constitutional limitations on government power to restrict the
use of public streets and parks by public speakers.' 9
Despite the strong pro-speech language for which Hague is now best
known, it was not inevitable that the case would transform the Court's public
forum jurisprudence. For one thing, the language quoted in the introduction to
this Article is dicta that appears in a plurality opinion. Also, as Geoffrey Stone
and Harry Kalven have pointed out, even the Hague plurality did not reject the
basic premise of the Holmes position-i.e., that the government possessed
17 See Davis v. Massachusetts, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895), t'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897)
("For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or
public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the
owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.").
18 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
19 See id. at 515.
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common law property rights equivalent to those of a private landowner. 20
Despite accepting this premise, the plurality reached their speech-favorable
conclusion by creating what Kalven called "a kind of First-Amendment
easement. "21
Regardless of the tenuous theoretical and precedential value of Hague, the
decision clearly presaged a major change in the way the Court approached
public forum cases. This became clear in the cases coming to the Court in the
years immediately following the Hague decision. In these cases, the Court
reaffirmed its Hague dicta and communicated its unwillingness to uphold
regulations of speech in public forums based on government interests that were
relatively trivial, or which could be addressed in ways other than suppressing
speech. Thus, only eight months after Hague, the Court held in Schneider v.
New Jersey22 that municipalities could not prohibit leafleting on public streets
and sidewalks based on the governments' desire to prevent littering.23 Four
years later, a similar case arising in Texas provided the Court the opportunity to
interpret Hague as having rejected the Holmes theory of governmental property
rights, 24 thus definitively establishing the Court's new theory of public forum
jurisprudence.
This new public forum jurisprudence was not an absolute victory for free
speech rights. From the beginning, the Court conceded that the use of public
forums for "purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public issues" would require a certain amount of government
regulation, if nothing else to prevent two competing demonstrations from
2 0 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. (r.
REv. 233, 238; Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 13.
21 Kalven, supra note 20, at 13.
22 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
23 See id. at 162 ("We are of the opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of
good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a
public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it.").
24 See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). The Court stated:
The city contends that its power over its streets is not limited to the making of reasonable
regulations for the control of traffic and the maintenance of order, but that it has the
power absolutely to prohibit the use of the streets for the communication of
ideas.... This same argument made in reliance upon the same decision [Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1895)] has been directly rejected by this Court [in Hague].
Id. at 415-16; see also Saia v. New York City, 334 U.S. 558, 561 n.2 (1948) ("Though the
statement [in Hague] was that of only three Justices, it plainly indicated the route the majority
followed, who on the merits did not consider the Davis case to be controlling.").
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marching on the same street simultaneously. 25 The Court was careful in each of
its early decisions to leave open several avenues for continued government
regulation when necessary to "'prevent confusion by overlapping parades or
processions, to secure convenient use of the streets by other travelers, and to
minimize the risk of disorder.' 26 According to the Court, public order and
time, place, and manner regulations of activity such as traffic obstruction or
disorderly behavior must be permitted even in a public forum because "such
activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or
distribute information or opinion." 27 These concessions have no natural limit,
and at times the Court has described the permissible rationales for regulating
the public forum so broadly that the regulatory exceptions could easily swallow
the freedom whole.28
But even taking into account the unavoidable "public order" and "time,
place, or manner" regulations of public forums, and the Court's occasionally
excessive deference to the government in applying these regulatory
justifications, the development of the public forum doctrine represented a clear
advance for free speech, not only in the actual holdings of the cases, but also in
the Court's broad rhetoric about the importance of speech in the early public
forum decisions. In most of the Court's early public forum cases, the Court
emphasized the need to protect public dissemination of "novel and
25 See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 ("two parades cannot march on the
same street simultaneously, and government may allow only one").
26 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (quoting State v. Cox, 16 A.2d
508 (N.H. 1940)).
27 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.
28 The most obvious instance of this is Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), in which
the Court noted that a constitutional guarantee such as freedom of speech "implies the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would
be lost in the excesses of anarchy. The control of travel on the streets is a clear example of
governmental responsibility to insure this necessary order." Id. at 554. From this "avoidance
of anarchy" premise, the Court concluded that "[w]e emphatically reject the notion... that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would
communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and
highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech." id.
at 555. The Court also hinted in Cox that a "uniform, consistent, and nondiscriminatory
application of a statute forbidding all access to streets and other public facilities for parades
and meetings" might be constitutional. Id. Fortunately, the Court has never applied this
wholesale expansion of the time, place, and manner regulatory rationale in the traditional
public forum contexts of streets, sidewalks, and parks. However, the governmental property
rights theory that underlies the broad Cox notion of government regulation is evident
throughout the Court's limited public forum jurisprudence. See infra notes 41-98 and
accompanying text.
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unconventional ideas [that] might disturb the complacent." 29 The Court also
demonstrated its savvy understanding that regulations ostensibly directed at the
manner of speech often cloak the government's disagreement with the content
of the speech. 30 Thus, it is all the more unfortunate that the Court's ability to
creatively envision the public forum's role in protecting unpopular expression
failed when the Court began to confront expressive contexts that did not quite
fit the mythical mold of Speakers' Corner. After having creatively defined the
public forum, the Court soon began building a fence around it to keep the
concept from spreading.
B. Closing the Public Forum
In several of the Court's early efforts to apply the public forum analysis to
nontraditional forums, the prognosis for broad protection of speech appeared
good. In 1966, a plurality of the Supreme Court used the public forum doctrine
to overturn the conviction of several civil rights activists who were arrested for
conducting a silent sit-in at a segregated public library.31 The plurality's
reasoning took the Court's existing public forum doctrine to the next logical
step, applying to a public library the First Amendment rules applicable to
sidewalks and parks. Thus, the plurality applied the First Amendment to protect
the right "in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and
reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be, the
unconstitutional segregation of public facilities." 32 According to the plurality's
analysis, the facts characterizing this type of public property were not
significantly different than the traditional context of a park or sidewalk. Like the
29 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
30 See Saia v. New York City, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). The Court stated:
In this case a permit is denied because some persons were said to have found the sound
annoying. In the next one a permit may be denied because some people find the ideas
annoying. Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound. The power of
censorship inherent in this type of ordinance reveals its vice.
Id. at 562.
31 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). Justices Brennan and White provided
the fourth and fifth votes to strike down the state statute. Justice Brennan relied on an
overbreadth analysis and thus did not reach the issue of whether the defendants' actions would
be constitutionally protected under an appropriately narrow statute. See id. at 147 (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White relied on an Equal Protection Clause analysis,
based on the fact that the defendants were excluded from the library because they were black.
See id at 151 (White, 1., concurring in the judgment).32Id. at 142.
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park and sidewalk, the library was open to the public and was a site
traditionally ustd for the dissemination of ideas. Also, no specific governmental
task would be disrupted by silent protests in a library. Thus, the library
protesters' activity was limited only by the same sort of time, place, and
manner concerns applicable to similar activities in a park.33 In Brown,
therefore, the protest was protected, since "there was no disturbance of others,
no disruption of library activities, and no violation of any library regulations." 34
It was left to the First Amendment "absolutist" Hugo Black35 to harken
back to the Holmesian common law model in defending the government's
authority to deny some citizens entry to new forums such as public libraries.
Justice Black stated:
I have never believed that [the First Amendment] gives any person or group of
persons the constitutional right to go wherever they want, whenever they
please, without regard to the rights of private or public property or to state
law.... [The First Amendment] does not guarantee to any person the right to
use someone else's property, even that owned by government and dedicated to
other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas.36
Of course, parks and sidewalks were also the government's property, but the
simple fact that these traditional speech sites were outdoors seems to have been
enough to distinguish them in the mind of Justice Black from the insides of
publicly-owned buildings and government meeting halls. 37
33 Brown was decided before the Court had settled on its current articulation of the time,
place, and manner test, but the references in Brown to the prevention of disturbance in the
library is the sort of content-neutral regulation of speech in a public forum that the Court has
now assimilated into the time, place, and manner analysis. The modem statement of the time,
place, and manner test can be found in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vtolence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984). Under this standard, regulations of expression in a public forum "are valid
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id. at 293. For a
discussion of the interplay between the public forum doctrine and time, place, and manner
rules, see infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
34 Brown, 383 U.S. at 142.
35 See Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes" A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 559 (1962).
36 Brown, 383 U.S. at 166 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Justice Black's majority
opinion in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), in which the Court upheld trespassing
convictions against students protesting outside a jail on a driveway and adjacent grassy area.
"The State," Justice Black wrote, "no less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id. at 47.
37 Brown, 383 U.S. at 157. Justice Black stated:
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Over the next decade or so, the Court would employ reasoning similar to
that employed by the Brown plurality to open other government facilities that
had been closed to unpopular speakers. One notable application of the theory
was Southeast Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,38 in which the Court prohibited the
city of Chattanooga, Tennessee from barring a production of the musical
"Hair" from a municipal theater. 39 The Supreme Court treated the matter as an
instance of prior restraint in a public forum. The Court dealt with the public
forum issue succinctly by focusing on the typical uses of a municipal theater:
"The Memorial Auditorium and the Tivoli [Theater] were public forums
designed for and dedicated to expressive activities.'4 It was irrelevant that the
government owned the property, and served in effect as the proprietor of a
commercial enterprise. As long as the "Hair" production did not conflict with
other uses of the auditorium, and there was no time, place, or manner concern
such as noise or crowd size, the city was barred by the First Amendment from
refusing to rent its facilities to a theatrical production whose message was
strongly opposed by the government and the community it represented.
Cases such as Brown and Conrad were encouraging to speakers seeking
access to new and different forms of government-owned property. However,
the Court soon foreclosed the possibilities opened by these cases. During the
The problems of state regulation of the streets on the one hand, and public buildings on
the other, are quite obviously separate and distinct.... Order and tranquility of a sort
entirely unknown to the public streets are essential to their normal operation .... [It is
incomprehensible to me that a State must measure disturbances in its libraries and on the
streets with identical standards.
Id.
38 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
39 The Chairman of the Board of Directors appointed by the city to run the auditorium
testified that the Board had a policy of allowing only "those productions which are clean and
healthful and culturally uplifting," id. at 549, whereas the Board found that the musical
"Hair" "involved nudity and obscenity on stage." Id. at 548. The Board reached this
conclusion at a time when none of the Board members had seen the play or read the script.
See id.
40 Id. at 555; see also id. at 563 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Douglas stated:
A municipal theater is no less a forum for the expression of ideas than is a public
park, or a sidewalk; the forms of expression adopted in such a forum may be more
expensive and more structured than those typically seen in our parks and streets, but they
are surely no less entitled to the shelter of the First Amendment.
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1970s and early 1980s the Court began limiting the scope of its new public
forum decisions by carving out a series of exceptions from the public forum
doctrine for particular kinds of public property.
For example, the Court refused to find that the advertising space on a city
public transit system constituted a public forum. "Were we to hold to the
contrary," the Court declared, "display cases in public hospitals, libraries,
office buildings, military compounds, and other public facilities immediately
would become Hyde Parks open to every would-be pamphleteer and
politician." 41 The key to this case was the Court's determination that the
government had a legitimate interest in regulating certain forums to preserve the
forum for a particular function assigned to that forum by the government. By
similar logic, the Court upheld a policy barring anti-war activists from making
political speeches or distributing leaflets in an otherwise public area of a
military base.42 The outcome of this case was predictable, given the Court's
typical deference toward regulations of speech by the military,43 but it soon
became obvious that the Court would judge even civilian forums according to
each forum's "special attributes," especially with regard to the "nature and
function of the particular forum involved."44
Thus, only five years after permitting the government to restrict speech in
public areas on a military base, the Court would employ a similar analysis to
41 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974). The Court also relied
on a variation of the common law government-as-property-owner rationale, by emphasizing
that the operation of the transit system by the city was a proprietary, not a governmental
function. "Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street comer, or other public
thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in commerce." Id. at 303. Of course, the same
could be said of Chattanooga's operation of its Municipal Auditorium. See Southeast
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546. Also, it is not immediately obvious why, if the
city-as-property-owner can decide to use some of its property for commercial purposes, it
could not also exercise its proprietary discretion over other property for non-commercial uses,
such as, for example, devoting public park land owned by the city solely to restful,
recreational uses, free of bothersome speeches and protests.
42 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). For the lengths to which military officials
will go to preserve the intellectual decorum on their bases, see Etheredge v. Hail, 56 F.3d
1324 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding Air Force base administrative order prohibiting bumper
stickers that "embarrass or disparage" the commander-in-chief, and applying rule to ban
bumper stickers of civilian aircraft mechanic, which read "HELL WITH REAGAN" and
"READ MY LIPS HELL WITH GEO BUSH").
43 See Greer, 424 U.S. at 838. The Court stated: "A necessary concomitant of the basic
function of a military installation has been 'the historically unquestioned power of [its]
commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the area of his command.'" Id. at
838 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 893 (1961)).
44 Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-
51(1981).
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deem postal boxes non-public forums.45 In the postal case, the Court held that
"it is difficult to conceive of any reason why this Court should treat a letterbox
differently for First Amendment access purposes than it has in the past treated
[military bases or jails]." 46 Thus, since postal boxes were not subjected to a
public forum analysis at all, the essentially commercial government interest in
"protect[ing] mail revenues while at the same time facilitating the secure and
efficient delivery of the mails" was sufficient to trump the speakers' interest in
gaining access to an efficient means of communicating with other citizens.47
During this same period, the Court also determined that time, place, and
manner regulations should be judged differently depending on the context of the
forum. Thus, in Grayned v. City of Rockford,48 the Court held that regulations
limiting speech on a sidewalk outside a school could be justified on time, place,
and manner grounds more easily than the regulation of speech in a park.49
"The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time." 50 Along the same lines, in Heffron v. International Society for KIishna
Consciousness, Inc.,51 the Court upheld time, place, and manner regulations of
speech at a public fair based on the Court's conclusions about the differences
between the nature of groups of people collected on city streets and groups of
people at a fair.52
Whether the Court was applying the time, place, and manner doctrine, as
in Grayned and Heffron, or was deeming a forum non-public, as in the postal
case, it became obvious during the 1970s and early 1980s that the Court's focus
on notions of compatibility and context would give the government a powerful
tool to limit speech on public property. Except in the most traditional kinds of
4 5 See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981) (upholding postal regulation restricting access to postal boxes exclusively to materials
bearing postage).
46 Id. at 129.
47 See id.
48 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
49 See id. at 116.
50 Id.
51452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding Minnesota state fair rule restricting solicitation, and
limiting the distribution of literature and leaflets to an assigned location within the
fairgrounds).
52 See id. at 651. The Court drew a distinction between a public street, which it
characterized as "a place where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and
neighbors in a relaxed environment," id., and a state fair, which according to the Court
attracted "great numbers of visitors who come to the event for a short period to see and
experience the host of exhibits and attractions." Id.
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forums-parks and sidewalks-the government could effectively circumvent the
public forum doctrine by simply designating a very specific, narrow, and non-
expressive use for a particular piece of public property. The Court's conclusion
that the government could suppress speech in a forum simply by asserting its
intention that speech was not "the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time" 53 was odd in light of the public forum doctrine's express
instruction that public property be used for "purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 54
Yet, in 1983, this is precisely what the Court said the public forum doctrine had
come to mean.
In 1983, the Supreme Court explicitly authorized the government to close
non-traditional forums to most or all of the many forms of private expression
that the government must tolerate in parks and on sidewalks. In Perry
Educational Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,55 the Court
created the three-tier system that continues to define the Court's public forum
analysis today. According to the Perry opinion, a government-owned forum
can be defined as a traditional, "quintessential public forum[ ]";56 a non-
traditional designated public forum "which the State has opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity"; 57 or a non-public forum, i.e.,
"[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication." 58
At first glance, the Perry Court's statements regarding the First
Amendment rules that apply to each type of forum seem favorable to speech.
For example, the Court asserts that government regulation of speech in a non-
traditional, designated public forum "is bound by the same standards as apply in
a traditional public forum," 59 which means that the government can only
impose limited time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in that forum.
Thus, once a court deems a non-traditional forum "public," the speaker is well
on the way to gaining access to that forum. The other side of the coin,
however, is the Court's treatment of non-public forums. Under the Perry three-
tier scheme, once a forum is deemed a non-public forum, the Court reverts to
the old common law government-property approach to define the government's
authority to dictate public access: the government, like a private property
53 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.
54 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
55 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
56 Id. at 45.
57Id.
58Id at 46.
59 Id.
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owner, can close such forums to expression altogether, so long as it does not do
so selectively according to the viewpoint of the speaker.60 In practice, the
government will almost always win disputes over access to a non-public forum.
As this analysis indicates, Peny has made the characterization of a disputed
government forum the key to modem public forum analysis. Once a new forum
is labeled either public or non-public, the battle over whether private speech can
occur in that forum is usually decided. Unfortunately, Peny also skewed the
criteria by which these characterizations are decided in favor of the
government. Under Peny, it is not difficult for the government to construct a
plausible case that any new or non-traditional forum falls into the non-public
category. Thus, the third type of forum identified by the Peny opinion-the
non-public forum-is much larger than one would suspect given the Court's
pro-speech comments in Peny and the broadly protective approach toward
speech evident in previous public forum cases such as Brown and Conrad.
Two aspects of the Peny approach toward characterizing forums have been
instrumental in denying public access to non-traditional forums. First, Peny
further entrenched the Court's growing tendency to assess the character of a
non-traditional forum by reference to the government's intent as to how that
forum should be used. Second, although the Court recognized in Peny that
non-traditional forums could be converted into public forums by intentional
government designation, it also provided the government a handy tool for
limiting the scope of designated public forums by allowing the government to
open the forum only to certain types of speech (i.e., speech that the government
seeks to foster), while leaving the forum closed to other speech that the
government opposes. Thus, "[a] public forum may be created for a limited
purpose such as use by certain groups ... or for the discussion of certain
subjects. "61
These two aspects of Peny greatly increase the government's power to
foreclose expression in non-traditional forums. Peny created a system in which
the government has two prime opportunities to win a dispute over the
characterization of a new forum. In any case in which the government has
foreclosed speech in a non-traditional forum, the government will initially argue
under the first aspect of the Pery analysis that it did not intend to open the
forum to expression at all. If, as is usually the case, there is contradictory
evidence that the government has already invited some expression in the forum,
the government will then fall back on the second aspect of Peny, asserting that
the expression previously permitted in the forum involves different groups or
topics than the applicant's proposed expression. Because the second aspect of
60 See id.
61Id. at 46 n.7 (citations omitted).
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the Peny analysis provides that a designated public forum can be limited in
virtually any way the government wants-i.e., either by subject matter or the
identity of the speaker-the government should (if Peny were applied
consistently) almost always prevail.
The typical operation of the limited public forum argument can be seen in
Peny itself. The case involved an application by a union to communicate with
public school teachers through the school district's interoffice mail system.62
The school board denied the union access to the mail system because another
union, which was the currently designated representative of the teachers, had
exclusive access to the system. 63 When this exclusivity arrangement was
challenged by the competing union under the public forum doctrine, the school
board's first argument was that it had not created even a limited public forum
by operating the interoffice mail system.64 However, as is typical in limited
public forum cases, the school board's argument was contradicted by the fact
that it had routinely permitted groups such as the YMCA, the Cub Scouts, and
other community and church groups to communicate with school personnel by
using the interoffice mail system.65 Under the second aspect of the Peny
analysis, these problematic facts did not significantly harm the school board's
defense to the competing union's First Amendment claim. According to the
Supreme Court, the school district may have created a limited public forum for
the Girl Scouts by inviting the Cub Scouts to use the mail system, but it did not
create a public forum for unions. 66 The Court simply viewed the government's
intent in opening the forum very narrowly. Outside the very specific parameters
of the speech invited by the government, the forum owned by the government
remained a closed, non-public forum: "Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic
forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter
and speaker identity." 67
If the government retains entirely "the right to make distinctions in access
on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity,"68 then the
designated/limited public forum category identified in Peny becomes virtually
useless. All exclusions from government-owned forums will be based on the
speaker's identity or the subject matter of the speaker's speech. And as Peny
62 See id. at 40-41 (discussing the Peny facts).
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 48.
66 See id.
67 Id. at39.
681d.
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itself indicates, the phrase "speaker's identity" can be read very narrowly. 69 In
Perry, the Court allowed the government to deny one speaker (the outside
union) access to a forum, while granting a second speaker of the same type (the
inside union) full and free access to that same forum, based on the
government's contention that the inside union had a different relationship to the
audience based on its insider status.70 By this logic, political incumbents would
be allowed to argue that they, but not their adversaries, should be given
exclusive access to public meeting halls and auditoriums based on the
incumbents' need to service the immediate needs of their constituents.
Perhaps the best news to come out of Perry is that the courts have usually
refrained from pushing the Perry logic to this extreme. Even so, lower courts
applying the Perry analysis have generated some bizarre results in cases
involving non-traditional forums. Like the result in Perry itself, many of these
post-Peny lower court decisions are based on hypertechnical distinctions and
counterintuitive conclusions regarding both the scope of the contested forum
and the nature of the government's intent regarding speech in that forum. For
example, one recent public forum case in the Second Circuit involved a dispute
over the use of the "Spectacular," a large billboard looming over the lobby of
Penn Station.71 An artist sought to rent the space from Amtrak.72 The artist
planned to mount a photomontage satirizing Coors beer advertisements, 73
accompanied by a text "criticiz[ing] the Coors family for its support of right-
wing causes, particularly the contras in Nicaragua." 74 Amtrak rejected the
montage, based on Amtrak's asserted policy that political advertising was not
permitted on the Spectacular. 75
This is a prime example of a "new forum" case. The Penn Station
Spectacular is basically a government-owned indoor billboard. Obviously a
69 Id. (characterizing school's forum limitations as "based on the status of the respective
unions rather than their views").
70 Id.
71 See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir.),
amended on denial of rehearing, 89 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675
(1996).
72 See id. at 653. Prior to the Second Circuit's ruling discussed in the text, the Supreme
Court had ruled that Amtrak is a government actor for purposes of applying the First
Amendment. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
73 See Lebron, 69 F.3d at 653. The montage contained the caption "Is It the Right's
Beer Now?" and included "photographic images of convivial drinkers of Coors beer,
juxtaposed with a Nicaraguan village scene in which peasants are menaced by a can of Coors
that hurtles towards them." Id.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 654.
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billboard is not a traditional public forum, but it is government property, and
the property is routinely held out by the government as an avenue for the
communication of ideas in a context where government operations will not be
hindered by the expression. Thus, the Penn Station Spectacular should be a
good candidate for an extension of the public forum doctrine. Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit used a particularly constricted application of the Perry analysis
to reject the artist's First Amendment claim against Amtrak.
The court's first approach to the public forum question was to treat the
Spectacular as the relevant forum, divorcing the no-politics policy regarding the
large billboard from the contrary policy permitting political advertisements on
the many other advertising spaces Amtrak leased throughout Penn Station. 76
Considering the Spectacular as a distinct forum, the court concluded that
Amtrak's consistent practice of renting the billboard only to commercial
advertisers rendered the Spectacular "a non-public forum, or perhaps ... a
limited public forum opened for purely commercial speech." 77 In operating the
Spectacular, the government was acting in its role as a proprietor of advertising
space, not a regulator of speech, and like any good business entity, the
government had to be concerned about offending its customers.
Unfortunately, the artist's petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals
pointed out that certain aspects of the record undermined the court's assumption
that Amtrak's policy regarding the Spectacular was separate from the broader
policy applicable to all other advertising space in Penn Station.78 The court
responded by amending its original opinion, ignoring its previous definition of
the forum and explaining away the seemingly political messages of
advertisements Amtrak had previously permitted about matters such as
homelessness, AIDS and the environment. 79 The court concluded that "Amtrak
is probably entitled to consider such [previous] advertisements 'public service
announcements' within the meaning of its standard licensing agreement," rather
than political speech analogous to the proposed work critical of Coors.80
The Second Circuit's analysis in this case demonstrates the flexibility of the
Perry standard, and how this flexibility often works to the government's
advantage. Courts that are so inclined have an easy time ruling in favor of the
government in a new forum case: they can define the forum so narrowly that it
includes only one small comer of the relevant public space (for example,
76 See id. at 655.
77 Id. at 656.
78 See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 89 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir.
1995) (Newman, J., dissenting to denial of rehearing).
79 See id.
80 Id. at40.
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focusing on one billboard rather than all advertising spaces). If that approach
doesn't work, then they can creatively describe the subject matter permitted in
the forum so that it excludes the topic of the proposed speech. Thus, "public
service" speech about admittedly political issues is permitted, but "political"
speech is not. Coors can present itself to the world as a fun-loving provider of
good, clean, commercial fun, but a dissenting artist is not permitted to rain on
Coors' parade by noting other consequences of the company's actions. The
government-owned forum is available for speech, but only speech that fits the
government's model of what its "customers" want to hear.
Even government property that looks very much like a park or sidewalk-
both of which the Court continues to characterize as traditional, "quintessential"
public forums~l-is not immune from the restrictive implications of the Peny
analysis. For example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has used Perry to
reject a newspaper's public forum claim concerning a large open area at an
interstate highway rest stop.82 The court itself acknowledged that the
characteristics of the interstate highway rest areas in question "frequently
resemble those found in city parks, e.g., grassy areas, restrooms, water
fountains, parking areas, [and] picnic benches." 83 Nevertheless, the court
decided that the rest area was not a traditional public forum because
"[i]nterstate rest areas, like interstate highways, are relatively modem
creations," 84 which were "not to be planned for use as local parks.",85
Likewise, the court held that the rest areas were not designated or limited public
forums because the areas have the limited purpose of "facilitat[ing] safe and
efficient travel by motorists,"'86 rather than fostering communication. Once the
court found some way to avoid treating an avowedly park-like space as a
park-and therefore as a "traditional public forum"-the emphasis placed by
the Peny analysis on government intent gave the government an easy victory in
the case.87
81 See Peny, 460 U.S. at 45.
82 See Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189 (11th Cir. 1991).
83 Id. at 1203-04.
84 Id. at 1203.
85 Id. at 1204.
86 Id. at 1203.
87 See id. at 1202. The good news is that the flexibility of the Perry analysis also permits
lower courts to mold their perceptions of particular forums in a speech-friendly way. On the
matter of interstate highway rest areas, see Jacobsen v. Howard, 904 F. Supp. 1065, 1070
(D.S.D. 1995) (holding unconstitutional South Dakota statute prohibiting placement of
newsracks on sidewalks at interstate rest areas): "The State's interests in meeting the safety,
rest, and information needs of its interstate travelers are not jeopardized if newspaper
publishers are permitted to engage in their constitutionally protected activities at interstate rest
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Sidewalks-another "quintessential," traditional public forum-have also
occasionally received short shrift under the Peny analysis. The Supreme Court
itself rejected a public forum claim regarding a publicly-owned sidewalk in
United States v. Kokinda.8s The claim arose as part of a First Amendment
defense to arrests of several volunteers for the National Democratic Policy
Committee. s9 The individuals involved were distributing literature and soliciting
donations on a sidewalk running from a post office to its adjacent parking lot, in
violation of Postal Service regulations. 90 The Court upheld the restriction of
speech on the sidewalk, asserting that even though this particular piece of
property looked like a sidewalk, it did not really operate as a sidewalk. "The
mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis." 91
In Kokinda, the relevant sidewalk "was constructed solely to assist postal
patrons to negotiate the space between the parking lot and the front door of the
post office, not to facilitate the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or
city." 92 The Court never made clear why the nature of the sidewalk changed
because only a limited number of destinations could be reached on that
sidewalk, nor did it explain why unobtrusive speech (such as calmly asking
postal patrons: "Would you like to make a donation?") would in any way
interfere with the government's operation of a post office. Instead, the Court
took the Peny route and emphasized the government's preferences about the
use of its sidewalk. 93 Once the public forum issue becomes a matter of
government intent, the answer is usually going to be the same: "The Postal
Service has not expressly dedicated its sidewalks to any expressive activity. "94
Ergo, the speakers in Kokinda lost.
It is not difficult to project where this line of analysis can lead. One district
court has held that a public sidewalk leading to an equally public beach is not a
public forum because "[t]he sidewalk is new and small; it does not even extend
the full length of the beach. It was created to accommodate traffic to and from
areas." Id. The bad news is that the Eleventh Circuit's perceptions are more typical than those
of the district court quoted here.
88 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
89 See id. at 723.
90 See id. The regulations permitted the distribution of some types of literature, but
prohibited soliciting contributions, distributing commercial advertising, and campaigning for
public office. See id. at 724. As the Court noted in Kokinda, "[s]olicitation is a recognized
form of speech protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 725.
91 Id. at 727.
921d. at728.
93 See id. at 732-33.
941d. at 730.
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the beach and, only having been built two years ago, has not been a traditional
site for expressive conduct." 95 Of course, all sidewalks are built to
accommodate traffic from one place to another, and by definition a new
sidewalk will not have been "a traditional site for expressive conduct." 96 The
irony is that if the government may declare new sidewalks non-public forums,
these sidewalks will never develop into "traditional sites for expressive
conduct" because the police will arrest all speakers for entering a non-public
forum. The court's reasoning creates a logical loop, but it is consistent with the
Supreme Court's analysis in Perry.
The implications of such reasoning potentially extend to all public spaces.
The same court that denied access to the new sidewalk also held that the public
beach to which the sidewalk led was not a public forum either, noting that the
"sidewalk, contoured concrete sand barrier wall and newly constructed portals
demarcate the beach as a special area subject to greater restriction." 97 But if a
sidewalk, a wall, and portals demarcate a public open space as "a special area
subject to greater restriction," then is the quintessential urban park-New York
City's Central Park (to which the court's broad description applies)-suddenly
no longer a quintessential public forum? Aren't all parks set off from the
surrounding real estate in a way that makes them similarly special? If so,
doesn't the Peny designated public forum analysis (if applied rigorously)
exterminate the traditional public forum? And, therefore, isn't there something
fundamentally wrong with this analysis?
Indeed, there is something wrong with an analysis under which courts may
refuse to recognize sidewalks as sidewalks, and which permits the government
to win First Amendment cases siniply by announcing its intent that speech be
excluded from a particular government-owned venue. Although many of the
more egregious applications of this analysis occur in the lower courts, the
primary fault lies with the Supreme Court for creating the complex calculus of
government intent, traditional property use, and compatibility between speech
and forum function, which has characterized public forum analysis since Peny.
There have always been dissenters to the Peny analysis on the Supreme Court,
such as Justice Brennan, who in his dissent to Peny suggested an approach
similar to that advocated in this Article.98 Recently the group of Peny skeptics
on the Court has been joined by an unlikely ally: Justice Kennedy. Justice
Kennedy's approach does not contain the entire solution to the many problems
posed by Peny, but his approach provides a starting point for the ultimate
95 Chad v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 861 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1062.
98 Compare Perry, 460 U.S. at 63 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) with sources cited infra
notes 115-98 and accompanying text.
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solution to these problems-i.e., abandoning Peny altogether. The next section
discusses both Justice Kennedy's solution and my own.
II. A MODEST PROPOSAL TO REOPEN THE PUBLIC FORUM
The complications and contradictions introduced into the public forum
analysis by Peny have not escaped the notice of the Supreme Court. Many of
the present Justices on the Court have expressed dissatisfaction with the state of
the law in this area. The post-Peny public forum doctrine may not be the most
fractured area in modem constitutional law, but it comes close. It is therefore
no surprise that one of the most important recent cases to confront the
intricacies of the public forum doctrine in the Supreme Court produced no
fewer than four different approaches to the public forum doctrine, none of
which garnered the support of a majority of the Court. This case-International
Society for Krishna Consdiousness, Inc. v. Lee99-provides a scorecard of the
present status of the public forum doctrine on the Court. The case also provides
an insight into Justice Kennedy's thinking on the subject, which is significant
because he may contribute the fifth vote to overturn or substantially revise
Perry in some future case.
A. Perry's Messy Legacy: International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
In International Society for Kishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,10° the
Supreme Court was forced for the second time in five years to assess the forum
status of a publicly-owned airport.101 This issue had come to the Court in a
previous case, but the Court resolved that case on overbreadth grounds, 102
which left lower courts badly split on applying Peny in the airport context. 103
The facts in Lee were similar to other airport cases: Members of the Krishna
sect sought to distribute literature and solicit donations inside the terminals at
the three major public airports controlled by the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey. The Port Authority permitted such activities on the sidewalks
99 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
10 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
101 See id. at 675.
102 See Board of Airport Comm'ns v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 570 (1987).
Jews for Jesus involved a resolution by public airport commissioners prohibiting all "First
Amendment activities" at the Los Angeles International Airport. See id. The clumsy phrasing
of the resolution made the Court's overbreadth holding almost inevitable.
103 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 677 n.2 (collecting conflicting lower court cases).
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outside the terminals, but prohibited both distribution and solicitation inside the
terminals. 104
As in all Peny cases, the Court had to resolve several issues before
deciding whether the government or the speaker prevailed in the case. First, the
Court had to decide whether the airport was a public forum.105 Then, the Court
had to decide which standard applied to the airport forum, and apply the
relevant standard to both the distribution of literature and the solicitation of
funds. 10 6 Given the complexities of the public forum doctrine and the facts in
the case, several outcomes were possible, and various members of the Court
managed to endorse four different assessments of the constitutional protection
provided to speech in this context.
With regard to the public forum issue, a four-person plurality composed of
the Chief Justice and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas was joined in a
separate concurrence by Justice O'Connor to produce a holding that an airport
is neither a traditional nor designated public forum.'0 7 Then, as to whether the
distribution of literature was permissible inside the terminals, Justice O'Connor
broke with the plurality and joined the other four members of the Court in
ruling in favor of the Krishnas. O'Connor argued that even if the airport
terminal is not a public forum, restrictions on speech must still be reasonable,
and "reasonableness" is determined in reference to the forum's "special
attributes" and "surrounding circumstances." 108  Because of the many
commercial establishments already permitted in the terminal, O'Connor noted,
the Port Authority is essentially running "a shopping mall as well as an
airport."' 109 Therefore, O'Connor determined that restrictions on the
distribution of Krishna literature in the airport terminal are unconstitutional
(even though the terminal is a non-public forum) because the restrictions are not
"reasonably related to maintaining the multipurpose environment that the Port
Authority has deliberately created."110
If leafleting is compatible with other expressive activities that the airport
has deliberately invited in the terminal, it would seem that under Peny the
terminal had become at least a limited public forum for purposes of leafleting.
Yet Justice O'Connor denied the public forum designation. Moreover, she also
ruled in favor of the state's restrictions on solicitation, despite the fact that her
104 See id. at 675-76.
105 See id. at 679-83.
106 See id. at 683-85.
107 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 674; id. at 686 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108 See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110 Id.
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"shopping mall" description of the airport terminal suggests that the airport
authorities had expressly invited other forms of solicitation. Justice O'Connor
concluded that although many other establishments in the terminal were
soliciting funds in the form of payment for magazines, food, and other items
offered for sale throughout the terminal, the differences between these activities
and solicitation by Krishnas and other non-commercial groups "in a nonpublic
forum are sufficiently obvious that its regulation may 'rin[g] of common
sense.'" 111
This is the mess that Peny's legacy has created. Even when a majority of
the Court can agree on the characterization of a forum, the Justices cannot
agree on what that characterization means. The confusion is not limited to the
faction of the Court that tends to deny public forum status to nontraditional
forums. In Lee, four members of the Court granted public forum status to the
airport terminal, but they split on whether regulations restricting solicitation
were permissible in such a forum. Justice Kennedy ruled that such regulations
constituted permissible time, place, and manner restrictions on speech," 2 while
the other three Justices ruled that regulation of solicitation was
unconstitutional." 3 Likewise, the four Justices who ruled in favor of the
Krishnas on the leafleting ban used a completely different analysis than Justice
O'Connor, who provided the crucial fifth vote to overturn that regulation
despite denying public forum status to the airport terminal.
It is no surprise that decisions such as Lee lead to inconsistent results in the
lower courts. Given the absence of majority support on the Supreme Court for
any coherent theory of public forum jurisprudence, a conscientious lower court
judge who must rule on a new public forum case has no option but to engage in
a kind of nose-counting jurisprudence-simply counting the noses of Justices
who seem to have protected speech (under whatever theory) in a type of forum
similar to the one being considered by the lower court. Sadly, the nose-counting
style of jurisprudence fostered by cases such as Lee is no longer unusual in
constitutional law. 114 But in the area of public forum jurisprudence there is a
111 Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112 See id. at 703 (Kennedy, j., concurring in the judgment).
113 See id. at 711-15 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114 'Me Supreme Court has even issued a formal standard to guide lower courts in
deciphering the Supreme Court's splintered decisions: "When a fragmented court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.'" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). This leads to some odd outcomes, as in Lee itself, where the
opinion stating the "narrowest grounds" is endorsed only by one Justice. In Lee, the Court's
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way out of this maze, which is suggested by Justice Kennedy's theoretical
approach to the issue of the public forum, if not by his inconsistent application
of that theory to the facts of Lee.
B. Justice Kennedy's Public Forum Revisionism
Justice Kennedy does not fit the model of the typical judicial conservative
when it comes to First Amendment free speech issues. His opinions on First
Amendment subjects ranging from prior restraint 15 to flag burning116 are
worthy of the staunchest judicial free speech advocates. Recently, Justice
Kennedy has turned his attention to the public forum doctrine in two major
opinions that suggest his disenchantment with the restrictive theory currently
governing the area. One opinion is Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lee,117
and the other is his opinion for a majority of the Court in Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the University of Virginia,118 in which Justice Kennedy used the
public forum paradigm to define the constitutional standard applicable to
government programs funding expressive activities. In these opinions, Justice
Kennedy underscores the flaws in the existing doctrine, minimizes or rejects
most of the basic components of the Peny analysis, and provides a hint of the
protections that would become available to speakers in government venues if
the Court revisits and overrules Peny.
Justice Kennedy's Lee opinion attacks the two centerpieces of Peny's
unfortunate legacy-the Court's requirement of "a long-standing historical
practice of permitting speech" 119 to identify a traditional public forum, and the
"opinion" on the leafleting issue is the ruling of Justice O'Connor, who provided the fifth
vote to protect that speech, but whose opinion was joined by no other Justice. See Lee, 505
U.S. at 685-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The lower courts have learned to live with such
ironies. "Although there is some awkwardness in attributing precedential value to an opinion
of one Supreme Court justice to which no other justice adhered, it is the usual practice when
that is the determinative opinion." Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 888 F.2d 975, 981 (3d Cir.
1989).
115 See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 560 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that prior restraint doctrine should prohibit application of forfeiture order to portion
of adult bookstore's inventory that has not been deemed obscene).
116 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(providing the fifth vote in support of proposition that First Amendment protects flag burning
as protest gesture, and noting that "[ult is poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those
who hold it in contempt").
117 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 693.
118 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
119 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 694 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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use of government intent to identify a designated public forum. 120 Kennedy's
reason for rejecting the Court's current approach nicely summarizes the fatal
flaw in Perry: " his analysis] leaves the government with almost unlimited
authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing more than
articulating a non-speech-related purpose for the area, and it leaves almost no
scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare approval of
government." 121 The facts of Lee provide an illustration of how the Perry
system now works to the disadvantage of speech: with regard to the Perry
historical-use analysis, the Lee majority held that airports are relatively new
forums, hence there is no long-standing tradition of speech, hence they are not
traditional public forums. 122 Likewise, with regard to the Perry government-
intent analysis, the Lee majority held that "because governments have often
attempted to restrict speech within airports, it follows a fortiori under the
Court's analysis that they cannot be so-called 'designated' forums.' 123 Thus, in
Lee, as in many other new-forum cases analyzed under Perry, the government
is permitted to bar speech from what appears to be an open public space.
Kennedy's solution to the problem is to fundamentally revamp the Perry
analysis, if not abandon it altogether. "In my view the policies underlying the
[public forum] doctrine cannot be given effect unless we recognize that open,
public spaces and thoroughfares which are suitable for discourse may be public
forums, whatever their historical pedigree and without concern for a precise
classification of the property." 124 Kennedy's support for a flexible and broad
concept of the public forum is key to successfully applying the public forum
doctrine to new and different types of public property. Kennedy recognizes that
the old, Speakers' Corner/public park concept of the public forum is no longer
very relevant to the modern world. "In a country where most citizens travel by
automobile, and parks all too often become locales for crime rather than social
intercourse, our failure to recognize the possibility that new types of
government property may be appropriate forums for speech will lead to a
serious curtailment of our expressive activity. "125
In his Lee opinion, Kennedy proposes to replace the emphasis on historical
use and government intent with an objective inquiry "based on the actual,
physical characteristics and uses of a property." 12 6 According to this new
120 See id.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 680 (plurality opinion).
123 Id. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 697.
125 Id. at 697-98.
126 Id. at 695.
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standard, "[i]f the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and
the actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the government
indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those
uses, the property is a public forum." 127
Kennedy's proposed revision of the public forum standard does not entirely
abandon the traditional reference point of the Speakers' Comer-type forum, nor
does it completely ignore the government's intent with regard to the permissible
uses of a piece of public property. Kennedy lists three "important
considerations" in determining whether a piece of government property is a
public forum under his revised standard. 128 Two of these three considerations
resemble factors that are already central to the Peny analysis: "whether the
property shares physical similarities with more traditional public forums, [and]
whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public access to
the property." 129 If these "important considerations" were the primary focus of
Kennedy's new standard, then the standard would not add much to existing
analysis. Such considerations, which deny public forum status to anything that
does not resemble the context of a very traditional-and now outmoded-model
of public discourse, are the very factors that have led to what Kennedy himself
identifies as the main flaw in modem public forum analysis, i.e., that "few, if
any, types of property other than those already recognized as public forums will
be accorded that status." 130
It is the third "important consideration" that distinguishes Kennedy's
revised public forum standard from the problematic Peny analysis, and which
is the focal point of his broader view of protected speech in "new" forums. The
third consideration is "whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a
significant way with the uses to which the government has as a factual matter
dedicated to the property." 13 1 On its face, this appears to be nothing more than
a restatement of the incompatibility analysis previously used by the Court in
Grayned v. City of Rockford132 to uphold a prohibition on speech outside a
public school, and in Greer v. Spock133 to uphold regulations of speech in the
public areas of a military base. But Kennedy's phrasing of this consideration is
significantly different than the Court's description of "incompatibility" in its
earlier cases.
127 Id. at 698.
128 See id.
129 Id. at 698-99.
13 0 Id. at 697.
131 Id. at 699.
132 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
133 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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In the Supreme Court's version of the incompatibility analysis, "[t]he
crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.'1 34 Under this
view of "incompatibility," the government's preferred use of the forum defines
the reference point for every other expressive activity in that forum. Thus, as
noted above, the Supreme Court used the incompatibility analysis to uphold
rules governing speech in public areas of a military base. 135 A lower court
recently extended the Supreme Court's analysis to uphold a regulation under
which a civilian was prohibited from placing on his pickup truck a bumper
sticker bearing the inscription "HELL WiTH REAGAN," on the ground that
the sticker "embarrass[ed] or disparage[d]" the President. 136 According to the
Court of Appeals opinion upholding this regulation, innocuous political speech
by a civilian in a public area of a military base could be banned because it was
incompatible with the military's need to "foster instinctive obedience, unity,
commitment, and espirit de corps" throughout the facility. 137 The fact that the
offending bumper sticker on a civilian's pickup truck did not in any way
prevent the government from engaging in its own activities on the base was
irrelevant to the Court's application of the incompatibility test. The
government's broad authority to narrowly define the scope of permissible
expression in a particular forum was the final determinant of whether that
expression satisfied the constitutional standard; once the relevant officials made
their own determination that the speech was incompatible with their goals, the
Court simply deferred to the officials' judgment.138
The Court's incompatibility test inevitably works in favor of the
government because it depends on the government's own definition of the
proper uses of a forum and provides no mechanism for judicial scrutiny of the
government's choices. Justice Kennedy's focus on incompatibility cures this
problem by reversing the analysis. Under the Court's version of the test, speech
is only protected if the speaker proves that his or her speech is not incompatible
134 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.
135 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976).
136 Etheredge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1995). After the change in
administration, the plaintiff replaced the sticker noted in the text with one that read "READ
MY LIPS HELL WITH GEO BUSH." Id. at 1325. Then, after the next election, he replaced
the second sticker with one that read "HELL WITH CLINTON AND RUSSIAN AID." Id.
at 1326.
137 Id. at 1328 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
138 See id. ("[Military officials need not demonstrate actual harm before implementing a
regulation restricting speech.... [Officials... had a right to promulgate the order in
response to their evaluation that Etheredge's sign constituted a clear danger to military order
and morale.").
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with the use of the forum as defined by the government-a nearly hopeless task.
Under Justice Kennedy's version of the analysis, speech on public property is
presumptively protected unless the government proves that the speech would
interfere "in a significant way" with the government's own use of the
property.' 39 Kennedy thus abandons the Court's emphasis on whether speech is
"incompatible" with the government's own stated objectives, in favor of an
"interference" analysis, with the burden now shifted to the government, and the
presumption running in favor of speech.
Kennedy's interference analysis is clearly intended to impose a significantly
higher burden on government efforts to suppress speech on public property than
is imposed under the current incompatibility analysis. Kennedy emphasizes that
in assessing whether speech interferes "in a significant way" with government
activity, "[t]he possibility of some theoretical inconsistency between expressive
activities and the property's uses should not bar a finding of a public forum, if
those inconsistencies can be avoided through simple and permitted regulations,"
such as narrow time, place, and manner restrictions. 140 Also, Kennedy
emphasizes that the government must approach speech in a new forum in
general terms, rather than by focusing on particular instances of speech:
"[C]ourts must consider the consistency of [the government's] uses [of
property] with expressive activities in general, rather than the specific sort of
speech at issue in the case before it." 141 Forcing the government to litigate new-
forum cases in general terms would prevent the government from singling out
specific examples of unpopular speech for suppression, and would also prevent
the government from litigating every instance of proposed speech in a new
forum. Once a court has determined that speech in general would not interfere
with the government's use of the property in question, the government would
be obligated to respect future speakers' access to the same forum. Finally,
although the government would be permitted to change the nature of the forum
from public to nonpublic (as it is permitted to do under current law), Kennedy
underscores the difficulty of that task: "[When property is a protected public
forum the State may not by fiat assert broad control over speech or expressive
activities; it must alter the objective physical character or uses of the property,
and bear the attendant costs, to change the property's forum status."'142
Justice Kennedy's discussion of the interference analysis in Lee would go a
long way toward clarifying the confusing and speech-hostile nature of current
public forum analysis. But throughout Lee, Kennedy refers to the "physical
139 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 700.
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characteristics" of property subject to his analysis. This emphasis on physical
property is fine for new forums that have a distinctive physical existence, but it
fails to provide guidance for other cases-such as government regulation of the
Interet, for example-that could profit from much of the analysis in Kennedy's
Lee concurrence. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,143 Justice Kennedy broadens his approach to take account of
government programs implicating speech that do not necessarily involve the
regulation of a discrete piece of physical property. Rosenberger thus suggests
how the interference analysis can be used in cases far removed from the
traditional context of parks and sidewalks.
Rosenberger involved a challenge to the rules governing the allocation of
money from the University of Virginia's Student Activities Fund. The Fund
was financed by a mandatory fee of fourteen dollars per semester for all full-
time students. 144 The Fund was set up "to support a broad range of
extracurricular student activities that 'are related to the educational purpose of
the University.'"'145 The rules of the Fund excluded certain activities from Fund
support, including religious and political activities. 146 A "religious activity" was
defined as any activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." 147 Based on this rule, the
University denied funding to a student group, which sought to use the funds to
publish a religious newspaper.
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Rosenberger. He ruled that
the denial of university funds to the student group constituted a violation of the
group's First Amendment free speech rights. 148 For present purposes, the
important aspect of Kennedy's opinion in this case is that he treated the student
activity fund as a public forum. 149 There is little in Kennedy's opinion to
143 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
144 See id. at 824.
145 Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 61a).
146 See id at 825.
147 Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 66a).
148 See id. at 837.
149 There is another troublesome aspect of Rosenberger, which I will mention briefly but
not dwell on here. The case involved the provision of state money to a religious organization
to operate a journal with a specifically Christian perspective and content. See Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 865-68 (Souter, J., dissenting). "Even featured essays on facially secular topics
become platforms from which to call readers to fulfill the tenets of Christianity in their lives."
Id. at 866. The University argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that to provide state
funds to this endeavor would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See
18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994).
Protection of religious speech under the First Amendment is problematic (in this and
other cases) because the same Amendment that contains the Free Speech Clause also contains
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the Establishment Clause. This complicates the free speech problem in two ways. First, the
Establishment Clause prohibits even private religious speech when it occurs in a context
where the speech is facilitated by or attributable to the government. The school prayer and
bible-reading cases illustrate this point. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962). Thus, the government must be much more careful when it aids private religious
speech than when it aids political or other nonreligious speech. Justice Kennedy himself noted
the reason for this in his majority opinion in Weisman:
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different mechanisms.
Speech is protected by insuring its full expression even when the government
participates, for the very object is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as its
own. The method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom of conscience in
religious matters is quite the reverse. In religious debate or expression the government is
not a prime participant, for the Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to
the freedom of all .... [Tihe Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of
state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions.
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 591.
The second complication created by the Establishment Clause in Rosenberger is the
nearly absolute rule against providing state funds directly to finance religious activities. This
rule dates from the earliest Supreme Court precedents on the subject. See Everson v. Board of
Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion
clause'... means at least this .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice their religion."). This rule is simply the institntionalization
of James Madison's axiom that a government contribution of even "three pence" to a
religious group constitutes an impermissible establishment of religion. See 1 James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in MADISON 183-91 (n.d.),
reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 65-66.
These two strands of Establishment Clause doctrine should cause grave problems for any
effort to extend the University of Virginia's Student Activity Fund to explicitly religious
undertakings such as a religious journal. Justice Kennedy nevertheless rejected the
Establishment Clause arguments against extending the Virginia program to religious activities.
His reasons for doing so are, at best, strained. Kennedy argued, for example, that the
program was permissible because it also funded nonreligious activities. Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 840-41. Yet the Court has rejected several government efforts to fund parochial
schools in programs that were "neutral" in the sense that they also funded secular private
schools. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). Kennedy also
argued that there was a constitutionally significant "degree of separation" between the state
and the religious group because the University paid the printer of the group's journal rather
than paying the group directly. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843-44. Finally, Kennedy resorted
to arguing that the religious journal "is not a religious institution, at least in the usual sense of
that term." Id. These explanations are not sufficient in themselves to explain away the
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suggest that he found this a remarkable extension of the public forum analysis.
According to Kennedy, "[tihe most recent and most apposite case is our
decision in Lamb's Chapel [v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District]."150 Lamb's Chapel involved a religious group's effort to gain access
to a public school auditorium for the group's film series.15 1 Lamb's Chapel, in
turn, was based on previous cases involving access to public school facilities,
such as Widmar v. Vincent.152 Lamb's Chapel and Widmar fit easily within the
public forum analysis because both cases involved physical portions of
government-owned property. Kennedy viewed Rosenberger as essentially
indistinguishable from these cases. "The [Student Activity Fund] is a forum
more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same
principles are applicable."1 53 Thus, Kennedy ruled that the University must
make funds available to all groups as long as those groups' expressive activities
do not undermine some legitimate governmental purpose. "Once it has opened
a limited forum... the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself
set. 154
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,155 is the
only other Supreme Court precedent considering the extension of public forum
analysis to "metaphysical" forums such collections of money. In that case, the
Establishment Clause limits on state aid to religious groups such as the one in Rosenberger,
but for purposes of this Article, I shall focus on the Free Speech Clause aspects of Kennedy's
opinion and defer discussion of the Establishment Clause aspects for another day and another
article.
150 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)).
151 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387-89.
152 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that university had created a limited public forum by
permitting registered student groups to use school facilities for meetings, and that religious
student groups must be permitted to use facilities under same rules). In Lamb's Chapel, the
school district had permitted many other community groups to use the facilities for a variety
of purposes. 508 U.S. at 391-92 n.5. Based on this background, the Church argued that the
school district had created a limited public forum for similar community activities. See id. at
391. The Court noted that this argument "has considerable force," but the actual holding of
the case is that the school district had engaged in viewpoint discrimination against the Church,
which is prohibited even in a nonpublic forum. Id. at 392-93. In Rosenberger, Justice
Kennedy also ruled that the state had engaged in viewpoint discrimination against the religious
group, but rather than avoiding the public/nonpublic forum issue, as the Court had done in
Lamb's Chapel, Kennedy treats the case as one involving a limited public forum. See
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
153 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
154 Id.
155 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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Court used the Peny intent analysis to hold that the metaphysical forum was
nonpublic. The Court held that the Combined Federal Campaign ("Campaign"
or CFC), a charity drive aimed at federal employees, could exclude charities
that did not "provide or support direct health and welfare services to individuals
or their families" 156 because the government did not intend to create a forum
for expression when it created the Campaign.' 57 Even though the Court ruled
against the speakers seeking access to the CFC, the significant aspect of
Cornelius is that the Court clearly defined as the relevant forum an
instrumentality of communication that had no physical existence. Thus, Justice
Kennedy's Rosenberger opinion is not a radical extension of the public forum
analysis. Even so, the combination of the Rosenberger "metaphysical"
definition of a forum with Kennedy's interference analysis for determining
when speech must be permitted in that forum has the potential to radically
transform public forum analysis. It also has implications for the law regarding
government subsidies for speech, which thus far has been relatively unfriendly
to strong protection of speech under the First Amendment. Before turning to a
few examples of how the interference analysis would change existing law, it is
necessary to modify Justice Kennedy's standard to permit a more concentrated
focus on Kennedy's main point: that public forum determinations should be
governed by assessments of whether private expression will interfere with
legitimate government activities.
C. Fine-Tuning Justice Kennedy's Interference Analysis
The remainder of this Article discusses the implications of a public forum
analysis derived from Justice Kennedy's suggestions in Lee and Rosenberger.
Although there is a clear link between the interference analysis proposed here
and Justice Kennedy's version, there are also several differences. The version
of the interference analysis proposed in this Article and discussed infra is
significantly stronger (that is, more speech-favorable) than Kennedy's own
version. I have modified Justice Kennedy's analysis to correct four weaknesses
that appear in his otherwise generally favorable treatment of speech in public
forums.
1. Modification One: Eliminate Consideration of Government Intent in
Defining Public Forums
The first weakness in Justice Kennedy's own statement of the interference
analysis is his continued reliance on government intent to define the nature of a
156 Id. at 795.
157 See id. at 805.
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designated public forum. The extent to which Kennedy continues to rely on this
factor is unclear, although Kennedy discusses the role of government intent
frequently enough to suggest it plays an important part in his scheme of public
forum jurisprudence. In Lee, for example, Kennedy cites governmental intent
as one of the "important considerations" in determining whether a piece of
government property is a public forum under his revised standard. 158 Likewise,
in Rosenberger, Kennedy cites favorably the element of intent inherent in the
old common law model of government-as-property-owner: "The necessities of
confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the
discussion of certain topics." 159 In Rosenberger, Kennedy relied heavily on the
finding that the University had intended to "expend[ ] funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers." 160 Kennedy implies that if the
University had announced a different intention for the forum, the First
Amendment might not apply, even if the mechanics of the program operated in
exactly the same way.161
Kennedy's reliance on governmental intent regarding the permissible
expressive uses of a particular forum is inconsistent with both the spirit and the
letter of the interference analysis. Moreover, to the extent that the government's
own intent with regard to a particular forum is allowed to come into play at all,
the interference analysis is completely undermined. The interference analysis
would be nothing more than a restatement of the Grayned incompatibility
analysis 162 if "interference" were judged by the government's own stated intent
about the proper discussions that could take place within a forum, rather than
by an independent judicial assessment of whether private discussions disfavored
by the government would interfere "in a significant way"'163 with the
government's conduct of its own affairs. The whole point of Kennedy's
interference analysis is to prohibit the government from stating a censorious
intent in order to close a forum that realistically could be used for a wide range
of private expression without impeding the government's own legitimate
activities.
158 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698-99
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing as a factor "whether the government has permitted or
acquiesced in broad public access to the property").
15 9 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
160 Id. at 834.
161 The illogic of this result is also evident in Kennedy's attempt to reconcile
Rosenberger with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). For a discussion critical of
Kennedy's conclusions on this subject, see infra notes 297-322 and accompanying text.
162 See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
163 Lee, 505 U.S. at 699.
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Completely ignoring the government's stated intent regarding the use of
public property may seem to risk permitting private speech to intrude into many
public spaces where such expression does not belong. However, a pure version
of the interference standard would not result in overly extravagant protection of
First Amendment rights where such rights clearly are inconsistent with existing
uses of government property. Indeed, a pure interference standard would be
likely to produce more intuitively correct outcomes than a rigid focus on
inevitably tendentious statements of government intent. The next section of this
Article contains a detailed argument supporting this conclusion, 164 but for
present purposes this point can be illustrated by applying the interference
analysis to public school facilities.
It would be obvious under the interference analysis (as it is under the
Court's current standard165) that the First Amendment protects the expressive
activities of private student groups using a public university's facilities
(including classrooms) after school hours. It would be equally obvious under
the interference standard that the same facilities would be off-limits to much
private speech during the day when classes are being held. Irrelevant or
disruptive expression in a university or public school classroom would not be
protected under a pure interference analysis if it interfered with the main point
of the relevant government enterprise-teaching students about a certain
subject. A student group would have a First Amendment right to use public
educational facilities to hold meetings discussing the legalization of marijuana,
but the First Amendment would not prevent a public university or school from
removing a student from a classroom if the student insisted on loudly
advocating the legalization of marijuana during a mid-term exam in a calculus
class. The interference analysis would not grant First Amendment rights where
they do not belong, but at the same time the interference analysis would
improve on the Court's current approach by focusing the analysis on the real
issue, and confining the government's power over speech to areas where the
government must protect its own activities from interference by private
expressive behavior. The Court currently approaches disputes such as these
through the prism of governmental intent, 166 but an analysis of intent adds
nothing to the salient fact that in some circumstances private expression
prevents the government from doing its job. The intent analysis is therefore
superfluous, and Justice Kennedy's continued reliance on it is unwarranted.
164 See infra notes 199-293 and accompanying text.
165 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
166 See discussion of the public school forum cases, infra notes 252-93 and
accompanying text.
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2. Modification Two: Eliminate the Category of the Designated (or
Limited) Public Forum
The second weakness in Justice Kennedy's version of the interference
analysis is his continued recognition of the designated public forum category. It
is unclear how this category fits into Justice Kennedy's revised scheme of
public forum jurisprudence. On one hand, Kennedy's interference theory seems
inconsistent on its face with the notion that the government may designate a
forum and then use its power to designate that forum to limit the subject matter
that may be discussed in the forum. Kennedy's entire theory is dedicated to
refuting the notion that speech is protected only in forums "which by history
and tradition ha[ve] been available for speech activity." 167 According to
Kennedy, "[i]n my view... constitutional protection is not confined to these
properties alone." 16s Kennedy's general intent to broaden free speech rights
beyond the narrow confines of existing forums leads him to express skepticism
about the designated public forum category. In his Lee concurrence, Kennedy
asserts that the Court's designated public forum category "provides little, if
any, additional protection to speech." 169
Then, having criticized the restrictive effects of the designated/limited
public forum concept, Kennedy goes on in the very next sentence to adopt the
ideas he has just rejected.
Where government property does not satisfy the criteria of a public forum, the
government retains the power to dedicate the property for speech, whether for
all expressive activity or for limited purposes only.... I do not quarrel with
the fact that speech must often be restricted on property of this kind to retain
the purpose for which it has been designatedP
Similar language appears in Kennedy's opinion in Rosenberger.17 1
These passages cannot be reconciled with Kennedy's interference analysis.
The basic theory of the designated public forum concept rests on common law
notions of broad government authority to dictate the use of public property. As
discussed in the previous section, these common law notions are fundamentally
167 Lee, 505 U.S. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 699.
170 Id. (citations omitted).
171 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
("The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain
topics.").
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at odds with the presumption of public rights of free expression embodied in the
Bill of Rights, and the Court has (at least in theory) recognized as much ever
since Hague v. C.LO. 172 Also, the designated public forum category depends
on the Court deferring routinely to the government's intent to limit speech in a
particular forum by both subject matter and speaker identity. This is
unacceptable for all the reasons stated succinctly by Justice Kennedy himself in
Lee: "It leaves the government with almost unlimited authority to restrict
speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a non-speech-
related purpose for the area, and it leaves almost no scope for the development
of new public forums absent the rare approval of the government." 173
Given his own skepticism about the usefulness of the designated/limited
public forum category, it is unclear why Kennedy accedes to its continued
existence as part of a revised public forum doctrine. The better approach would
be to eliminate the designated/limited public forum category and incorporate the
concerns that led to its creation into a pure interference analysis.
A rigorous application of the interference analysis would deal effectively
with the one legitimate function that can be asserted in favor of the
designated/limited public forum category-i.e., providing a mechanism for
extending constitutional protection to at least some speech in forums where
other speech would be inconsistent with the nature of the forum. The essence of
the interference analysis is the requirement that courts make assessments about
the compatibility of speech with the typical uses of a particular forum. The
difference between this analysis and the Court's current approach is that the
interference analysis focuses on the physical and operative characteristics of the
property in question, rather than the government's assertions about how it
wants the public to use government property for expressive purposes. All of the
legitimate factors that are now considered under the designated public forum
analysis would be taken into account when determining whether granting
members of the public a right to free expression would significantly interfere
with the government's own uses of public property.
Eliminating the designated/limited public forum category would not
restructure public forum analysis as radically as it first may appear. Under an
interference analysis, the courts would still be able to declare some government
property nonpublic forums, which would permit any restrictions on speech that
satisfies a simple reasonableness test (which is the standard the Court now
applies to nonpublic forums174). Thus, government property whose nature
172 307 U.S. 496 (1939); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
173 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
174 Restrictions on expression in a nonpublic forum "must be reasonable and 'not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.'"
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would not justify any broad access for public speech or other expression could
be closed to expressive activities to the same extent as it is under current
doctrine. Thus, the interference analysis would not require courts to give
demonstrators free access to the Oval Office of the White House, the atomic
research facilities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, or the nonpublic
sections of military bases. Indeed, the interference analysis will have little effect
on forums that are now classified as nonpublic. As the next section will
demonstrate, 175 the most extensive effects of the interference analysis will come
in cases in which the government has dictated subject matter restrictions on
expression in certain forums largely to squelch speech that embarrasses the
government or that challenges government policy. In cases such as these, the
interference analysis would permit the speech if no legitimate government
activity will be hampered, even if the speech occurs in what is now classified as
a "limited" public forum.
3. Modification Three: Limit the Application of Time, Place, and
Manner Restrictions in Public Forums
The third weakness in Justice Kennedy's statement of the interference
analysis requires a caveat rather than a modification of Kennedy's standard.
The third weakness has to do with the interplay of the public forum analysis and
the application of time, place, and manner restrictions that the Court permits
governments to impose on speech in public forums. 176 In Justice Kennedy's Lee
concurrence, he used the availability of time, place, and manner restrictions to
justify broadening the categories of forums that are open to free expression. 177
His theory seems to be that instead of declaring property off-limits to expression
as a nonpublic forum, courts should consider declaring property a public
forum, with limitations on speech imposed in the form of time, place, and
manner restrictions to take account of the government's legitimate interests.
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). A restriction on speech is "reasonable" if it
is "consistent with the [government's] legitimate interest in 'preserv[ing] the property... for
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.'" Perry, 460 U.S. at 50-51 (quoting U.S. Postal
Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)).
175 See infra notes 199-293 and accompanying text.
176 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[E]ven in a public
forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of
protected speech.").
177 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (In assessing whether expression
would significantly interfere with the government's use of public property "[c]ourts
must... consider the availability of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.").
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In the abstract, this approach is clearly preferable to the sort of restrictive
incompatibility analysis employed in Grayned,178 Kokinda,179 and other cases
that seem particularly conducive to the application of ordinary time, place, and
manner restrictions. The caveat to this abstract statement is necessary because
of Kennedy's application of time, place, and manner restrictions to deny
constitutional protection to the solicitation in Lee. In Lee, Kennedy argued that
although leafleting in a public airport is constitutionally protected, leafleting
accompanied by solicitation may be prohibited under the rubric of a time,
place, and manner restriction. 180 Kennedy argued that since the regulation
prohibited only "personal solicitations for immediate payment of money,' 181
the "regulation permits expression that solicits funds, but limits the manner of
that expression to forms other than the immediate receipt of money."'182
Kennedy argued that solicitation for immediate payment of money "creates a
risk of fraud and duress that is well recognized, and that is different in kind
from other forms of expression or conduct. Travelers who are unfamiliar with
the airport, perhaps even unfamiliar with this country, its customs, and its
language, are an easy prey for the money solicitor.' 183
Many of these assumptions are open to question. In response to Kennedy's
arguments, Justice Souter pointed out that there was nothing preventing
passengers at an airport from simply ignoring the solicitation and walldng by
the solicitor, and also noted that the Court had protected speech in contexts
where the speech was much more directly coercive than the airport
solicitors. 184 In any event, Kennedy preferred to treat the ban on solicitation as
if it were not a regulation of speech at all; rather, he treated the ban as a
regulation of the "manner" of speech, easily justified by the time, place, and
178 Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (involving speech on sidewalk outside a
school).
179 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (involving speech on sidewalk
leading to post office).
180 L~e505 U.S. at 704 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the alternative, Kennedy asserted
that the prohibition on solicitation may be regulated as symbolic speech, but the difference in
nomenclature is irrelevant since the Court now treats symbolic speech and time, place, and
manner regulations under the same standard. Id. ("[I]n several recent cases we have
recognized that the standards for assessing time, place, and manner restrictions are little, if
any, different from the standards applicable to regulations of conduct with an expressive
component.").
181 Id.
182 Id. at 705.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 713 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982) (discussing speech accompanying an economic boycott, in which threats of
violence were deemed too divorced from actual violence to lose constitutional protection)).
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manner standard. This attempt to skirt the free speech issue denies the content-
based distinction between the statement "Give me money now" and "Please fill
out this envelope and mail my organization a donation." Under Kennedy's Lee
opinion, the first statement was prohibited, but the second was not.
The main problem with Kennedy's approach is that he uses a very weak
standard for assessing whether a prohibition of speech is a legitimate time,
place, and manner regulation. This is not entirely Kennedy's fault; for several
years the Court has diluted the time, place, and manner standard to the point
where it gives the government a great deal of latitude to silence speech in the
guise of regulating the "manner" of speech. The root of the problem is that the
Court has failed to enforce systematically the part of the modem time, place,
and manner standard that requires such regulations to be "narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest. ' 185 As Professor Susan Williams has
noted, the time, place, and manner test "has developed... into a fairly clear
and fairly lenient standard. The government interest and tailoring requirements
are quite close to the rational basis standard applied to regulations that do not
affect fundamental rights at all."18 6
The lenient nature of the modem standard is evident in Kennedy's
treatment of the solicitation regulation in Lee. Even if Kennedy is correct to
presume that solicitation often poses a threat of fraud and coercion, the properly
focused response to that threat is to regulate the problem directly rather than to
ban all solicitation, most of which will not be fraudulent or coercive. As the
Supreme Court pointed out in a previous case striking down an overly broad
regulation of solicitation, "[t]he [government's] legitimate interest in preventing
fraud can be better served by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition
on solicitation. Fraudulent misrepresentation can be prohibited and the penal
laws used to punish such conduct directly., 18 7
This is not the place for a generalized attack on the flaws in the modem
time, place, and manner test. I raise this issue only to insist that the time, place,
and manner test should not be allowed to swallow the interference analysis.
Virtually unquestioned deference to governmental decisions to suppress speech,
such as that exhibited by Justice Kennedy in his discussion of solicitation rules
in Lee, would give the government an easy alternative to avoid the rules
imposed by the interference analysis.
This opening to suppression can be closed (or at least narrowed) in three
ways. First, government efforts to suppress speech should be viewed
185 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
186 Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 615, 644 (1991).
187 Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980).
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skeptically. In Lee, Justice Kennedy asserted that "[t]he [government] has made
a reasonable judgment that this type of conduct raises the most serious
concerns, and it is entitled to deference." 188 Total deference to bald
government assertions of potential harm are inappropriate in the context of
public forum analysis, where the presumption should always run in favor of
unfettered speech. Second, since the courts should not give unquestioned
deference to unproved government assumptions, the government should be
required to provide some proof that a particular type of expression creates an
actual problem in a public forum before the government resorts to a ban on that
expression. In Lee, the government was not required to produce proof that its
officers (or officers at other airports) had actually encountered severe problems
with coercive or fraudulent solicitations. Finally, the government should be
required to explain (and back up that explanation with facts) why it rejected a
less speech-restrictive option to address its legitimate concerns about the effects
of expression in a public forum. In Lee, which involved the Port Authority
rules governing New York City area airports, Justice Kennedy noted that far
less restrictive rules were in effect at other airports (such as the Federal
Aviation Authority rules governing Washington, D.C. airports189). Despite the
existence of workable rules permitting speech that the Port Authority had
banned, Kennedy held simply that "[o]ur cases do not so limit the government's
regulatory flexibility." 190
Kennedy's statement is flawed because "regulatory flexibility" should not
be the guiding principle governing judicial review of government regulation of
speech in a public forum. But this flaw can be corrected easily. The three
changes to the Court's approach to time, place, or manner regulations noted in
the preceding paragraph will reduce the "flexibility" currently built into the
system, and bring the Court's time, place, or manner analysis into line with the
speech-favorable presumptions of the revised public forum jurisprudence
proposed in this Article. With these changes in place, it is possible to concur
with Justice Kennedy's admonition that courts should consider imposing narrow
time, place, and manner regulations instead of totally excluding speech from a
nontraditional forum.
4. Modification Four. Abandon the Analogy to Traditional Forums
The fourth weakness in Justice Kennedy's Lee opinion is his use of an
analogy to traditional public forums as a reference point for identifying new
188 Lee, 505 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189 See 14 C.F.R. § 7.96(h).
190 Lee, 505 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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public forums. Kennedy lists as one "important consideration" in defining a
new forum "whether the property shares physical similarities with more
traditional public forums." 191 This is problematic because it ignores the
comprehensive changes in communication and social interaction that have
occurred in recent years. Linking the public forum doctrine to quaint notions of
Sunday strolls by Speakers' Comer will do nothing to open avenues of
communication in the world where most modem communication takes place-
inside public buildings and halls, alongside public buildings dedicated to
activities other than community gatherings, over government-developed
networks such as the broadcast media and the Internet, and through programs
funded by the government that facilitate the dissemination of ideas throughout
the country.
Elsewhere in his Lee concurrence, Kennedy acknowledges that the old-
fashioned model of parks and sidewalks has little significance to the way
modem people actually communicate. "In a country where most citizens travel
by automobile, and parks all too often become locales for crime rather than
social intercourse, our failure to recognize the possibility that new types of
government property may be appropriate forums for speech will lead to a
serious curtailment of our expressive activity." 192 Thus, the public forum
doctrine should be governed by its underlying theme, rather than by some
antiquated historical manifestation of that theme: "MIhe purpose of the public
forum doctrine is to give effect to the broad command of the First Amendment
to protect speech from governmental interference., 193 Kennedy's Rosenberger
opinion, which extended the public forum analysis to "metaphysical" as well as
"physical" forums, underscores the broad scope of protection potentially
offered by a revamped public forum doctrine. 194
The version of the public forum analysis proposed in this Article provides a
specific framework upon which this increased protection of speech in the
modem world can be assembled. As noted throughout this section, the proposal
is a development of Justice Kennedy's interference analysis. This proposal
shares Justice Kennedy's intention to broaden the protections offered by the
public forum doctrine, and also shares his premise that the public forum
doctrine is merely a mechanism to effectuate the "broad command of the First
Amendment to protect speech from governmental interference." 195 For this
reason, the public forum doctrine should not be limited to physical forums,
191 Id. at 698-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 697-98.
193 Id. at 697.
194 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
195 Id.
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much less to forums that closely resemble parks or sidewalks. Therefore,
borrowing a phrase from Justice Brennan's dissent in United States Postal
Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,196 and consistent with
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Rosenberger, the version of the
public forum doctrine proposed here would apply to any instrumentality
"specifically used for the communication of information and ideas.'197
5. A Summary of the Modified Interference Analysis
This is the gist of the analysis proposed in this Article: The question
whether an instrumentality of communication is a public forum depends on
whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a significant way with the
government's own activities in that forum. If the government cannot prove the
strong likelihood of significant interference, the forum is deemed "public" and
the speech must be permitted, subject only to the application of narrow time,
place, and manner regulations. Unlike Kennedy's statement of the interference
analysis, 198 the version proposed here would take into account the
government's actual activities in a particular forum, and would not permit
consideration of the government's abstract intent regarding the nature of the
forum. Also in contrast to Kennedy's version of the analysis, the version
proposed here would eliminate the designated/limited public forum category,
depending instead on a direct judicial assessment of the level of interference,
coupled with the application of narrowly tailored time, place, and manner
restrictions on expression.
With these modifications, the interference analysis suggested by Justice
Kennedy can greatly improve both the clarity and the substantive protections
offered by the public forum doctrine. By way of illustrating the salutary effects
of this analysis, the next three sections apply the strengthened interference
analysis to three sets of public forum problems. Part I addresses some of the
Court's recent public forum case law, and suggests a reconsideration of some of
the Court's conclusions in these cases. Parts IV and V address two "new
forum" problems-government subsidy programs and government regulation of
the Internet.
196 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
19 7 Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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III. THE INTERFERENCE ANALYSIS AND RECENT PuBLIc FORUM
JURISPRUDENCE
This Article proposes to revamp the public forum doctrine by recasting it in
the form of a strong interference analysis. This analysis is offered as a
corrective to the misguided direction of the Court's public forum jurisprudence
in recent years-especially since the Court's decision in Perry. 99 During this
period, the public forum doctrine has become too conducive to government
efforts to shut speech out of forums in contexts where the speech poses no real
threat to the government's own legitimate activities.
This Article presents the interference analysis as a modest proposal, but the
proposal is modest only in that it realigns public forum doctrine with the broad
pro-speech themes of the First Amendment and the natural expectations of
citizens in an open society. On the other hand, the ramifications of this modest
proposal are admittedly immodest in the sense that the proposal would cast into
doubt many of the Court's recent precedents favoring government efforts to
declare seemingly speech-friendly environments nonpublic forums.
Recommending a root-and-branch reconsideration of an entire body of case law
is usually the surest way to guarantee that a proposal will be ignored. But in an
area where the jurisprudence has deteriorated to the point that lower courts
make the public/nonpublic forum determination on the basis of the age of the
concrete in a sidewalk, 2°° maybe root-and-branch reconsideration is a serious
possibility after all.
The simplest way to illustrate the positive changes that would flow from
adoption of the interference analysis is to reanalyze several recent Supreme
Court and lower court decisions in which the courts refused to protect speech
under the current public forum doctrine. For purposes of illustration, these
precedents are divided into three categories: cases in which the Court has
denied speakers access to public property; 201 cases in which the government, in
its role as proprietor of advertising space in public facilities, has refused to rent
that space to speakers with controversial views;202 and cases involving speech
in public schools, in which the public forum doctrine has been used to justify
silencing the speech of students in contexts where student debate should
logically be tolerated or even encouraged. 20 3 These examples will illustrate the
199 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
200 See Chad v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 861 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
("The sidewalk is new and small .... [O]nly having been built two years ago, [it] has not
been a traditional site for expressive conduct.").
201 See infra notes 204-25 and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 226-51 and accompanying text.
203 See infra notes 252-93 and accompanying text.
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advantages (or at least the benign effects) of the proposed interference analysis.
These examples will also illustrate the insidious operation of the current
approach, which not only shuts down speech when the speech poses no
particular threat to legitimate activity, but also permits the government to
surreptitiously discriminate against disfavored speech and distort debate by
explicitly favoring some speakers over others.
A. The Interference Analysis and Access to Public Property
Many of the Supreme Court's recent decisions involving access to public
property would be cast into doubt by the adoption of an interference analysis
because much of the logic in those decisions would be irrelevant under the
revised standard. Consider Peny,204 for example, which has become the
touchstone for the Court's current public forum jurisprudence. In Peny the
Court allowed a public school system to deny a union access to an interoffice
mail system used to communicate between teachers and the school system's
administrators. 205 The record in the case indicated that the school system had
permitted many other groups to use the mail system in the past; these groups
included local parochial schools, church groups, the YMCA and the Cub
Scouts. 206 Also, the school system routinely allowed another union (which was
the teachers' certified collective bargaining representative) to use the interoffice
mail system. 207
Despite the fact that the mail system was already open to many speakers
other than school administrators and teachers, and also open to many unofficial
messages, the Court declared that the outside union could not send messages
through the system because the school administrators operating the interoffice
system did not intend to create a public forum. 20 8 Alternatively, the Court held
that the system was at most a limited public forum, i.e., limited to messages
sent by groups analogous to the YMCA and the Cub Scouts, or messages sent
by the inside union in its role as official representative of the teachers, which
the Court distinguished from messages sent by the outside union seeking to
challenge the teachers' official representatives. 209
204 Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
205 Id. at 51-52.
20 6 Id. at 39 n.2.
207 Id. at 40.
20 8 Id. at47.
20 9 Id. at 48.
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Much of. the discussion in the Perry majority and dissenting opinionsfocused on the issue of viewpoint discrimination. 210 This focus is
understandable, because one union was given access to a favored avenue of
communication, to which the other union was denied. The inside union's
obvious interest in preventing the competing union from easily disseminating its
views to the teachers belied the Court's formalistic rationale that the outside
union was denied access to the forum not because of its views, but because it
lacked the certified union's "status." 211 Contrary to the Court's assertion, the
outside union's views were bound up with its outsider status; but by
distinguishing between the union's status and its point of view, the Court could
conform the school district's actions with the one real constitutional limitation
on the regulation of speech in a nonpublic forum-i.e., the requirement that the
regulation be viewpoint neutral.
In contrast to the Court's very formalistic (and unconvincing) approach to
the Peny dispute, the interference analysis would avoid ethereal discussions
about whether a speaker was denied access to a forum because of that speaker's
"status" or its "views," and would focus instead on what should be the real
issue in every public forum dispute: Would private expression in the relevant
forum in any way prevent the government from doing its job? In Peny, the
answer to this question would clearly be "no." The government would be
prevented from doing its job in Perry only if the volume of additional mail sent
through the mail system would effectively prevent the administration from
communicating with its teachers through the system. Nothing in the Peny
record indicates that this was a potential problem, and the history of the
system's use as reflected in the record suggests that the school district would be
unlikely to muster proof that the system would be overwhelmed if the outside
union was permitted access. 212 Thus, under the interference analysis, the Perry
school district's interoffice mail system was a public forum, and the district
should have been ordered to give the outside union access to that system to
distribute its literature. 213
210 See id. at 48-54; id. at 55-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211 1d. at 49.
212 The school system evidently did not express any concerns about the mail system until
the outside union attempted to distribute its materials. The record in the case "[did] not
indicate whether any requests for use [had] been denied, nor [did] it reveal whether
permission must separately be sought for every message that a group wishes delivered to the
teachers." Id. at 39 n.2.
213 If the school system in Perry could prove that the administration's communication
with its teachers would be significantly burdened by permitting outside groups to distribute
information, the interference analysis would permit the school to declare the forum nonpublic,
and deny access to private speakers. An analysis of the actual burden posed by private speech
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The two factors that the Peny Court relied upon to deem the interoffice
mail system nonpublic-the school's intent, coupled with the limited public
forum doctrine-are irrelevant under the interference analysis. These factors
are omitted from the interference analysis because they are inconsistent with the
normative underpinning of the analysis-that the First Amendment requires the
government to tolerate speech on public property unless that speech directly
impedes the government's own legitimate activities. Peny illustrates why this
normative judgment should be rigorously enforced. If, as seems clear from the
facts of Perry, the government could have accommodated the speaker without
much effort, why did the government resist the accommodation? The lingering
suspicion in such cases is that the government's real motive in excluding the
speaker from the forum is either bureaucratic stubbornness or an unspoken
opposition to the speaker's ideas. Although a stubborn bureaucrat may not
share a censor's intentional malice toward dissenting speakers, both types of
government actors cause the same First Amendment harm: speech is silenced
for no good reason. Therefore, neither motive is sufficient to override the
strong constitutional protection of speech on public property.
Kokinda provides another illustration of this point. Kokinda involved a
sidewalk leading from a parking lot to a United States Post Office.214 The
sidewalk was located entirely on public property, and the Court conceded that
also suggests that the interference analysis would change the result in two other cases
involving claims similar to Perry: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985), and U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Associations, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
In Cornelius, the Court permitted the government to bar the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund and other nonprofit public interest organizations from a charitable campaign
directed at government employees, on the ground that the campaign was not a public forum.
Under an interference analysis, it is unlikely that the government could show that permitting
the public interest groups' participation would significantly impair the operation of the
campaign, especially today, when employee contributions can be deducted and distributed
electronically, which eliminates the need to devote extra personnel as the number of recipient
groups proliferate.
In Greenburgh, the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the deposit of unstamped
"mailable matter" in an individual's mail box. Again, the outcome of the decision was
inevitable once the Court declared mail boxes nonpublic forums (a conclusion the Court
supported primarily by referring to the government's longstanding assertion of control over
the forum). See Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 125-26, 128-29. Under an interference analysis,
the outcome in Greenburgh would be different unless the government could demonstrate that
the volume of unstamped "mailable matter" would fill the mail boxes and make it impossible
for the postal service to do its job of delivering the mail. As in Cornelius and Perry, it is
unlikely that the government could meet its burden under the proposed test.
214 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 723 (1990).
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individuals had generally "been permitted to leaflet, speak, and picket on postal
premises. " 215 Nevertheless, a plurality of the Court upheld a postal regulation
prohibiting anyone from soliciting contributions on postal premises because this
type of government property, including the sidewalk in question, is not a public
forum.216 Therefore, the prohibition on solicitation only was required to meet
the weak reasonableness standard applicable to nonpublic forums.217 The
plurality's rationale for deeming the sidewalk a nonpublic forum was that the
sidewalk "was constructed solely to provide for the passage of individuals
engaged in postal business." 218 By characterizing the sidewalk as a special-
purpose sidewalk, the Court avoided applying the traditional public forum
doctrine (which apparently only covers general-purpose sidewalks).
The extent of the Court's efforts in Kokinda to demonstrate that a sidewalk
is not a sidewalk indicates the lengths to which the Court will go under the
present public forum doctrine to characterize a forum as nonpublic. As in
Perry, the Kokinda plurality's efforts to characterize the forum as nonpublic are
disproportionate to the actual harm threatened by the speech in question. The
plaintiffs in Kokinda were members of the National Democratic Policy
Committee, who had set up a table on the post office's sidewalk to pass out
leaflets, solicit contributions, and sell literature. The post office had received
several complaints about the offending Democrats, but the only specific
complaint in the record came from an individual who objected to the
Democrats' presence "because she knew the Girl Scouts were not allowed to
sell cookies on federal property." 219 Thus, Kokinda did not involve any real
disruption of postal activities. The government's main concern in the case
seems to have been figuring out how to deal with the reactions of a bunch of
angry girl scouts.
Under the interference analysis, the government could not circumvent the
First Amendment so easily. The interference analysis would require the Court
to make a much more comprehensive and honest assessment of whether the
government's true interests were implicated by the expressive activity in
question. In Kokinda, as in Perry (and Lee, which involved a similar solicitation
ban), the answer was clearly "no." The government's interest in Kokinda was
ensuring that postal customers may quickly traverse the sidewalk and do their
215 Id. at 730.
216 Id. Justice Kennedy added the necessary fifth vote to uphold the regulation. He did
not address the public forum issue, but instead relied on a broad interpretation of the time,
place, and manner standard as applied to solicitation, similar to his later opinion in Lee. See
id. at 737-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
217 See id. at 730.
218 Id. at 727.
2 19 Id. at 723 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699, 705 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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business with the post office without being coerced or threatened on the way.
Simple regulations requiring speakers to leave a clear path on the sidewalk,
coupled with specific, rigorously enforced prohibitions of coercive or
threatening behavior, would protect the government's interests, and the interests
of postal customers. The Court should hold unconstitutional any regulation
imposing restrictions on speech beyond these narrow time, place, and manner
regulations.
In Kokinda, as in Peny, the government's enthusiasm for a total ban on a
particular kind of speech casts doubt on its true motivation. If the government
chooses to ban speech instead of enforcing a simple, obvious means to protect
its legitimate interests, the implication is that something other than the
government's stated interest is behind the regulation. This implication is
reinforced by the actual effect of the government bans in question. Broad
government regulations of speech such as those in Peny and Kokinda often
impose far greater burdens on speech than the Court acknowledged in those
cases. Government rules such as those upheld in Peny and Kokinda distort
debate in a way that has all the negative effects of viewpoint discrimination,
even if there is no direct proof that the government was in fact motivated by a
desire to suppress one side of a public debate.
In Peny, for example, the government's action skewed speech among
teachers pertaining to the effectiveness of their union representation, because
one union was given direct access to the teachers and the opposing union was
forced to undertake the more difficult, less systematic, and much more
expensive effort to contact each teacher at home. The Kokinda regulation also
distorted debate, although the point is somewhat less clear than in Peny
because the plaintiffs in Kokinda were not addressing an issue directly
associated with the post office. Nevertheless, in the context of modern suburban
life, a sidewalk outside a post office is much more likely to attract a broad
cross-section of the public on any given day than, for example, a public park.
Thus, groups denied access to this cross-section of the public will be forced to
choose other methods of raising funds-such as large-contribution fundraising
functions or direct-mail campaigns. And protesters who do not have the
resources to do large-scale fundraising may be left with no effective options at
all. Thus, the proliferation of Kokinda-type regulations of solicitation on public
property will skew the debate over many public issues in favor of larger, well-
financed lobbying organizations.
Moreover, the broad leeway Kokinda gives to government in defining the
limits of speech on the property surrounding public buildings can easily be used
in other contexts to distort debate about a particular government action. For
example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has used Kokinda to justify
upholding a public housing authority regulation that effectively prohibits the
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distribution of political literature to the residents of the authority's housing
projects. 220 This seems to fly in the face of the Supreme Court's previous
statements that "a public street does not lose its status as a traditional public
forum because it runs through a residential neighborhood," 221 but because of
the vagaries of public forum cases such as Kokinda, the rules protecting speech
in such traditional forums fall away if the government owns both the street and
the neighborhood.
In another example of how the PenylKokinda public forum analysis
distorts public debate, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently relied on
Kokinda to permit the State of Nebraska to bar members of a welfare rights
organization from distributing literature and talking to welfare recipients in the
lobby of a local welfare office. 222 As in Peny, the state had previously allowed
other groups access to the same forum.223 Nevertheless, the court held that
because the state had screened the speakers it permitted into the forum to
determine whether they provided a "direct benefit" to welfare recipients, the
forum remained nonpublic with regard to speakers the state decided not to
admit.224 The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that they were excluded from
the forum because of their attacks on welfare reform,225 but even if there was
no invidious motive, the effect is the same: under the current public forum
doctrine, the government is permitted to closely control speech to which the
public is exposed on public property, and the government's opponent is denied
the most effective access to the relevant group's constituency. The elimination
of the distorting effect on public debate is one of the strongest arguments for
adoption of the interference analysis.
B. The Interference Analysis and Advertising on Government Property
Distortions in public discourse similar to those evident in the public
property access cases are also evident in the cases dealing with the government
220 Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S.
1132 (1995) (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)) ("The official mission of
the Housing Authority is to provide safe housing for its residents, not to supply non-residents
with a place to disseminate ideas.").
221 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988).
222 Families Achieving Independence and Respect v. Nebraska Dep't of Soc. Serv., 111
F.3d 1408 (8th Cir. 1997).
223 The state had previously permitted a volunteer income tax group, a nutritional
information group, Head Start, a local community college, and the ubiquitous Girl Scouts
access to the forum. Id. at 1413 & n.6.
224 Id. at 1420.
225 See id. at 1423.
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in its role as proprietor of advertising space. Cases of this sort are not unusual.
The Lebron dispute, discussed supra,226 involved a Penn Station advertisement
critical of a beer manufacturer's policies regarding Central America. 227 Other
disputes have involved advertising pertaining to a variety of social or political
causes, including: sexual abstinence among teenagers, 228 birth control and
family planning advice, 229 AIDS education, 230 abortion,23 1 criticism of the
President,2 32 parody of a presidential candidate, 233 and union criticism of an
employer.2 34 There is even a Supreme Court decision on the subject, Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, in which the Court upheld a local transit authority's
refusal to accept any political advertising on its vehicles.235
The results in these cases are by no means uniform; sometimes the speaker
wins, sometimes the speaker loses. Perhaps this is the bright side of the current
public forum doctrine: In applying a standard that depends so heavily on a
subjective identification of the relevant forum, and an equally subjective
determination of the government's intent vis-A-vis that forum, a court that is so
inclined can often creatively interpret its way through the doctrinal morass to a
speech-friendly result. On the other hand, the flexibility built into the standard
leads to a fair amount of contradictory case law. Sometimes the conflicting
2 26 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
227 See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, 653 (2d Cir.),
amended on denial of rehearing, 89 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675
(1996).
228 See Yeo v. Lexington, 1997 WL 292173 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that public high
school newspaper and yearbook were public forums), rev'd, 1997 WL 748667 (lst Cir. 1997)
(en banc) (holding that student control over publications negated panel's finding of state
action).
229 See Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark City Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817 (9th
Cir. 1991) (en bane); Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767
F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985).
230 See AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
231 See Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 937 F. Supp.
425 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
232 See Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
233 See Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
234 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v.- Department of Aviation of the City of Chicago, 45
F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995).
235 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The Supreme Court also
issued an opinion in Lebron, but that opinion dealt only with the state action issue, and did not
address the public forum issues. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374
(1995).
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rulings in this area frustrate even normally sedate judges. For example, in 1991
the Ninth Circuit held that a public school system's operation of school
publications (such as yearbooks and school newspapers) did not reflect an intent
to create a public forum. Therefore, the appellate court upheld the school
system's refusal to sell or print any advertisement that the administration
deemed not in the school system's "best interest. 236 Earlier this year, on the
other hand, a panel of the First Circuit ruled against a public school system on
an identical claim, accusing the Ninth Circuit of "reduc[ing] the Supreme
Court's designated public forum doctrine to a circular nullity because it would
allow government to use impermissible content-based exclusions.., as
conclusive proof that the forum is not open to the public," 237 only to be
reversed six months later by the en banc First Circuit, which ruled that school
publications did not constitute state action, and therefore were not bound by
First Amendment restrictions. 238
Although the First Circuit's frustration is understandable, the Ninth Circuit
probably has a better grasp of the convoluted logic of current public forum
doctrine. This logic sometimes pulls the same litigant in opposite directions, for
reasons that have nothing to do with the legality or disruptiveness of the
litigant's speech. For example, the Second Circuit justified its ruling that
Michael Lebron did not have the right to buy advertising space in Penn Station
on the fact that the government had a history of excluding advertisements from
that forum based on the content of the ads;239 conversely, the District of
Columbia Circuit held several years earlier that the same Michael Lebron had a
First Amendment right to place another political advertisement on advertising
spaces in the Washington subway system because the transit authority did not
have a history of excluding political advertisements based on content. 240 It may
be contrary to the thrust of the First Amendment in other contexts, but in the
public forum area the Ninth Circuit got it right: the most effective means for the
government to close a forum is to develop a history of theoretically
impermissible content-based regulation of speech in that forum. Past
censorship, therefore, justifies future censorship. The linear thinkers of the First
Circuit aside, circularity has become what the modem public forum doctrine is
all about.
236 Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark City Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 824
(9th Cir. 1991) (en bane).
237 Yeo v. Lexington, 1997 WL 292173, at *11 (lst Cir. 1997).
238 yeo v. Lexington, 1997 WL 748667 (1st Cir. 1997) (en bane).
239 See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 89 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir.
1995).
240 See Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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Conflict and confusion among the lower courts in applying a complicated
First Amendment standard are not unique to the public forum cases. But in this
area, the confusion has its source in the inadequacies and illogic of the standard
set forth by the Supreme Court, which in turn reflects the Court's tepid support
of speech in nontraditional forums. Conflict among the circuits is not the most
serious problem in this area; the more serious problem is that the Supreme
Court's theory of these cases contradicts the lessons of open civic discourse
dictated in the Court's other decisions about abrasive speech in public forums.
The Supreme Court has often stated the principles of public discourse in
nearly absolute terms. Justice Harlan once wrote on behalf of the Court in
Cohen v. California that the First Amendment "is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of
us." 241 The principle of virtually unfettered freedom in public discourse applies
even to highly offensive discourse. 242 The Court has also noted that the
principle of unrestricted public speech is unmediated by the fact that the
expression will be heard or seen by unwilling listeners or viewers: "[W]e are
often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech." 243 The rule in cases where sensitive citizens encounter offensive
speech favors the speaker: "Mhe burden normally falls upon the viewer to
'avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his]
eyes.' "244
Unfortunately, once it moves away from the context of the traditional
public forum, the Supreme Court quickly renounces its ringing endorsement of
the "verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance" 245 that characterizes
vibrant public discourse. In the Supreme Court's only decision applying the
public forum doctrine to publicly owned advertising space, the Court allowed
the government to err on the side of protecting the most hypersensitive among
us. In Lehman, the Court upheld a government-owned transit company's total
ban of political advertising on city buses.246 According to the Court, the
advertising space was not a public forum (because the city had historically
engaged in content-based regulation of speech in the forum), and therefore the
city could limit speech in the forum to "innocuous and less controversial
241 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
242 See id. at 25 ("Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point
where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.").
243 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
244 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S.
at 21).
245 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
246 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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commercial and service oriented advertising." 247 In the nontraditional forum
context of Lehman the Court accepted the captive audience rationale for
suppressing speech that it had rejected in Cohen v. California, and cautioned
that if the city's alternative was rejected, "[u]sers would be subjected to the
blare of political propaganda. 248 So much for the "verbal tumult, discord, and
even offensive utterance" 249 that the Cohen Court had cited as the defining
characteristic of public discourse in a free society.
Decisions such as Lehman and Lebron are all. based on either the
paternalistic notion that the government has a valid interest in protecting
sensitive viewers from offensive speech, or the antidemocratic notion that the
government may protect commercial entities or politicians from criticism.
Neither rationale is sufficient to overcome First Amendment rights under the
interference analysis because neither rationale implicates the government's
ability to do its job. The government's "job" in these cases is nothing more than
the operation of a public transit system, train station, or other communications
medium where the advertising is located. It is never part of the government's
job to mediate public discourse or transform chunks of the public sphere into
sensory deprivation tanks containing nothing but innocuous and
noncontroversial speech. At the most basic level, the First Amendment dictates
that subjecting citizens to "the blare of political propaganda" in a public place is
a good thing. The interference analysis reflects this concept. Therefore, the fact
that the public place in question is a bus rather than a park should be irrelevant
to the public forum determination.
The public access and advertising cases illustrate how the restrictive themes
of the modem public forum doctrine can infect related areas of First
Amendment doctrine. In the PenylKokinda line of cases discussed in Part
III.A. supra,25 0 the public forum doctrine provides the government a tool with
which to surreptitiously distort debate to favor speakers friendly to the
government, thus diluting the traditional First Amendment rule prohibiting the
government from regulating the content or viewpoint of speech.251 In the
advertising cases the ideological distortions are not even surreptitious. The
ideological nature of the suppression in these cases is often evident on the face
of the government's decision to deny an advertiser access to the forum. These
cases not only dilute the First Amendment content-regulation rules, but they
2 47 Id. at 304.
248 Id.
249 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
25 0 See supra notes 204-25 and accompanying text.
251 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (describing the standard
governing content and viewpoint regulation of speech, including the presumption that such
regulations are unconstitutional).
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also weaken the most basic constitutional themes (represented by decisions such
as Cohen v. California) that describe what it means to live in a diverse, open
society. The third set of cases, which are addressed in the next subsection, are
in a sense the worst of all, because the public forum doctrine is used to provide
some unfortunate lessons to the next generation of citizens about the proper
relationship between individuals and society's authority figures.
C. The Interference Analysis and Speech in Public Schools
In the abstract, public schools and universities should be a model for public
expression under the First Amendment. In theory, these institutions are devoted
to open debate about every subject, and all opinions must be tolerated no matter
how far the speaker deviates from the mainstream. In practice, the courts have
often been willing to permit the authorities at public schools and universities to
regulate speech extensively. The public forum doctrine has played a role in
many of these cases.
As noted in Part II supra,2 52 some regulation of speech in public schools is
necessary. No one can be permitted to disrupt classes with loud discussions that
are irrelevant to the subject of the class. Likewise, schools cannot be deemed
public forums in the sense that unqualified persons can assert a constitutional
right to take (or teach) classes. Running an educational institution-especially at
the university level-requires selectivity if the enterprise of education is to
succeed. The interference analysis incorporates these observations by making
the public forum analysis tan on the government's ability to do its job; if the
government's "job" is education, then the government must be given the
leeway to impose reasonable restrictions that prevent interference with that
enterprise. To this extent, the interference analysis is consistent with existing
doctrine.253
Once the government is given the ability to prevent classroom disruptions
and make academic judgments about the curriculum and about student and
faculty qualifications, however, the interference analysis would make it difficult
to justify the exercise of governmental authority to limit student and faculty
speech. The application of the interference analysis is therefore consistent with
the few Supreme Court cases dealing with government restrictions on speech at
252 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
253 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981) (recognizing a "university's right
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rles or
substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education").
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the university level, which have tended to protect speech. 254 In public schools
below the university level, on the other hand, the interference analysis would
limit the government's control over speech to a far greater extent than the
Supreme Court's recent precedents, which have severely restricted First
Amendment rights, especially when they are exercised by students. 255
The root of the problem in the public school cases is the Supreme Court's
overriding theme that "First Amendment rights of students in the public schools
'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.'" 256 Likewise, since the Court has concluded that a public school does
not possess the attributes of a traditional public forum, the relevant standard is
determined by reference to the school authorities' intent regarding the use of the
forum.257 It should come as no surprise that the Court has been reluctant to find
that a school board has intentionally created a public forum for student
expression within a school. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhimeier, the
school system established a school newspaper and stated in a written policy that
"[s]chool sponsored school publications will not restrict free expression or
diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism." 25 8 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's determination that this had
created a public forum, on the ground that the newspaper was part of the
school's curriculum, over which the government officials had retained total
control.259
Thus, the rule in public schools is that "[a] school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,'.. . even though
the government could not censor similar speech outside the school." 260 And the
"educational mission" includes not just requiring students in a math class to
focus on math; it also includes the sort of decorum regulations outside a
classroom that even the Supreme Court acknowledges would be unthinkable
outside a school. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,261 for example, a
student gave a speech at a student assembly on behalf of a student council
candidate. The speech contained some mild sexual innuendo and double
254 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (prohibiting content-based restrictions on allocation of student activity funds); Wdnar,
454 U.S. at 263 (protecting rights of student groups to use university facilities for meetings).
255 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-(1988); Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
256 Kuhhmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682).
257 See id. at 267.
258 Id. at 269.
259 See id. at 267-70.
260 Id. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
261 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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entendre, 262 and was probably intended as a jibe at the school's teachers and
principals. It worked. School officials were predictably piqued and, equally
predictably, they suspended the student for three days and removed him from
the list of candidates for graduation speaker.263
In explaining why the school had authority to punish a student for making a
political speech in a public assembly simply because that speech upset the
school authorities, the Court referred to the school's "educational mission,"
which the Court interpreted broadly to include teaching students the "'habits
and manners of civility' essential to a democratic society. '' 264 According to the
Court, "[t]he schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the
essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that
tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged
in by this confused boy."2 65 The Court specifically linked the state's role as
ethical guardian to its role in regulating offensive speech. The Court noted that
although the student had the right to advocate unpopular and controversial
views, that right "had to be balanced against the society's countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."2 66
In sum, these are the themes that run through all the school speech cases:
the schools are not public forums, but are "instruments of the state"; part of the
state's "educational mission" in these nonpublic forums is to teach the "habits
and manners of civility" as well as math, science, and English; and the rights of
students to express themselves in ways that the school officials dislike are
balanced against the state's countervailing interest "in teaching students the
2 62 This is the speech in fMR1:
"I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's finn in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
"Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and sticks it in. If necessary, he'll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
"Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every
one of you.
"So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be."
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court called this speech "sexually explicit, indecent,
[and] lewd," id. at 684, and claimed that "it could well be seriously damaging to its less
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of
human sexuality." Id. at 683.
263 See id. at 678.
2.64Id. at 681.
265 Id. at 683.
2 6 6 Id. at 681.
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boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." 267 The lower courts have taken
these principles to heart. The lower courts routinely uphold broad restrictions
on student expression at school-especially when the student expresses
disrespect for the school authorities. Student expression on t-shirts worn at
school has been an especially popular target of the authorities. Here is a
representative sample of t-shirt inscriptions that the courts have held are not
protected by the First Amendment in the public school context: "Drugs
Suck!"; 268 "Coed Naked Band: Do It to the Rhythm"; 269 "See Dick Drink. See
Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't Be a Dick[.]"; 270 a caricature of three school
officials, portraying them drinking beer and leaning against a fence, with the
inscription "It doesn't get any better than this"; 271 "Unfair Grades"; 272
"Racism";273 and "I Hate Lost Creek." 274
Communicative t-shirts are not the only student expression that has been
suppressed on authority of the principles stated in Fraser. In Minnesota, federal
267 In the background df these principles are the remains of Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Supreme Court upheld a public school
student's First Amendment rights to wear a black armband to school to protest the Vietnam
war. The case is different in spirit and letter from the Court's later decisions on student
speech. According to the Tinker Court, students do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506. The Court also asserted
the very un-Fraser-like notion that "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved." Id. at 511. Fraser did not
overrule the venerable Tinker decision outright, but the nonpublic forum analysis generated by
Fraser has reduced Tinker to an afterthought in many decisions involving First Amendment
rights in schools. One District Court has concisely summarized the view most lower courts
now take of Tinker: "Although a few courts still employ the Tinker Test, we cannot ignore
that since the Supreme Court decided Tinker in 1969, it has developed an additional construct
for evaluating the regulation of speech in public places, namely the public forum analysis."
Hedges v. Wauconda Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 807 F. Supp. 444, 454 (N.D. M.
1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993). One purpose bf this
Article is to revamp the public forum doctrine as a means of restoring the influence of Tinker
in public school speech cases.
268 Broussard v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1527 (E.D. Va. 1992).
269 Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Mass. 1994).
270 Id.
271 Gano v. School Dist. No. 411, 674 F. Supp. 796, 797 (D. Idaho 1987). The court
reasoned that "[tihe administrators are role models, as stated by the United States Supreme
Court, and their position would be severely compromised if this T-shirt was circulated among
the students." Id. at 798.
2 72 Baxter v. Vigo City Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1994).
273 Id.
274 Id.
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courts upheld the suspension of students for distributing a newspaper (the "Tour
de Farce"), in which a student referred to vandalism at the home of a high
school teacher as "pretty damn funny." 275 In Indiana, a federal district court
upheld the suspension of students for distributing leaflets urging a "walk-out" to
protest unfair school disciplinary rules.276 In New York, a federal district court
upheld a ban on distribution of an underground school newspaper that referred
to the principal as "King Louis" and "a big liar" with "racist views and
attitudes." 27 7
Some of these cases (like Fraser itself) involve pure political speech-i.e.,
speech pertaining to an impending election-which (outside the public school
context, anyway) is at the core of the First Amendment. For example, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Tennessee high school's decision to
disqualify an honor student as candidate for student council president after the
student made "'discourteous' and 'rude' remarks about his schoolmasters in the
course of a speech delivered at a school-sponsored assembly." 278 An Arkansas
federal district court upheld school rules allowing teachers to veto an outspoken
honor student's candidacy for student council. 279 Punctuating the school's effort
to provide civic education to the Arkansas student, the court calmly concluded
275 Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Minn. 1987), aff'd, 855
F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1988). The Court of Appeals later upheld the school's policy requiring
prior review of newspapers and other literature before they could be distributed on campus.
See Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[We have clearly
rejected the view that prior restraints are per se unconstitutional in the high-school context.").
Like other central elements of the First Amendment, the prior restraint doctrine also receives
short shrift in public schools.
276 See Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23, 25 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
277 See Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
278 Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 758 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021
(1990). This is the offending remark, which was given at a candidates' fonum for the student
council election: "The administration plays tricks with your mind and they hope you won't
notice. For example, why does Mr. Davidson stutter while he is on the intercom? He doesn't
have a speech impediment. If you want to break the iron grip of this school, vote for me for
president. I can try to bring back student rights that you have missed and maybe get things
that you have always wanted." Id. at 759. The students in the audience responded by
"clap[ping] their hands, and yell[ing] things like 'way to go, Dean,' and 'we don't like him
either.'" Id. The school's principal found the remark "'inappropriate, disruptive of school
discipline, and in bad taste,'" and disqualified the student from the election. Id. In response to
the student's First Amendment claim, the federal appellate court lamented that a legal
challenge was even possible: "Until recent years, lawyers and educators alike might have
found it puzzling that such a question [whether the school violated the student's First
Amendment rights] should even be asked." Id. at 758.
279 See Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455, 1462 (E.D. Ark.
1990).
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that the "[p]laintiff does not have a constitutional right to run for high school
student council." 280 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has even applied
the restrictive rules imposed on secondary schools to a university's student
elections. The Eleventh Circuit upheld rules imposed by the administration of
the University of Alabama that strictly restricted both the distribution of election
literature and the holding of open forums or debates. 281 The court
acknowledged that such rules "could never withstand scrutiny in the 'real
world.' But this is a university, whose primary purpose is education, not
electioneering. "282
It is an odd process of civic education that teaches students about freedom
of speech by routinely denying that freedom-and then admitting that the denial
would never be upheld in the "real world." Perhaps the courts treat student
speech so cavalierly because to an adult's eyes the speech often appears trivial.
The republic will not fall if a student has to remove a "Coed Naked Band" t-
shirt, and the ramifications of a student government election are obviously less
significant than a national presidential election. But focusing on the trivial
nature of the speech effectively trivializes the rights in question. These cases are
not important because of the messages on the t-shirts; they are important
because they teach very specific lessons about the relationship between the ruler
(in these cases, the school principal and teachers) and the ruled (in these cases,
the students). These cases represent in microcosm the basic spirit of the First
Amendment (and for that matter, democracy itself): the individual's ability to
thumb his or her nose at authority in public and not be punished for the gesture.
The lower courts have taken seriously the Supreme Court's view that the
public schools' educational function includes the "'inculcat[ion of] fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."' 28 3
Thus, the lower courts tend to characterize school speech cases as cases about
civic education, and indeed they are. But the lessons these cases teach young
citizens are not good ones. The school cases teach that students should respect
governmental officials whose idea of values education is to suspend a student
for wearing a t-shirt with the inscription "Drugs Suck!" The cases teach that
students should defer to the judgment of government officials whose
overdeveloped sensitivities perceive Matthew Fraser's sly comments as obscene
and dangerous. The cases teach that if a political candidate's public statements
make the governing powers angry enough, that candidate may find his or her
280 Id. at 1461.
28 1 See Alabama Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d
1344, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989).
282 Id. at 1346.
283 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
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name removed from the ballot. In short, the cases teach young citizens to
internalize the values of a system that favors authority over liberty and has a
hard time distinguishing between the need for civility and the demand for
conformity.
The hopeful sign in these cases comes not from the courts but from the
students. When faced with judicial approval of governmental overreaction in
the name of civic education, the students often educate themselves in ways that
will hopefully replenish the reserves of constitutional liberty when they join
adult society. In Fraser, school officials removed Fraser's name from the ballot
for graduation speaker, but the students used write-in votes to elect him
graduation speaker anyway.284 When the Tennessee officials punished the
"discourteous" student by disqualifying him from the race for student council
president, the officials avoided the Fraser outcome by announcing that "'any
votes cast for [him] will not be counted." 285 Since the students had no way of
electing the offending student to the student council presidency, they responded
by electing him senior class president.28 6 When another school banned "Coed
Naked Band: Do It To The Rhythm" t-shirts, 287 the students responded by
printing new t-shirts. One bore the inscription "Coed Naked Civil Liberties: Do
It To The Amendments"; 288 another was inscribed "Coed Naked Censorship-
They Do It In South Hadley"; 289 and a third had "Coed Naked Gerbils" printed
on the front and "Some People Will Censor Anything" on the back.290 Perhaps
the school officials in these cases did teach their students something about the
"fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system"291 after all. Nothing swells the ranks of lifelong civil libertarians like a
little direct exposure to the blunt exercise of arbitrary authority.
On a doctrinal level, these cases are a direct result of the Supreme Court's
refusal to characterize the students' surroundings at a public school (as opposed
to the school's after-hours physical plant) as a public forum. The interference
analysis would lead the courts to very different conclusions than the courts have
made in the cases discussed above. The interference analysis would start with
the assumption that students attending a public school are operating in a public
284 See Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1357.
285 Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 760 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021
(1990).
286 Id. at 764.
287 Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Mass. 1994).
288 Id. at 162.
289 Id. at 163.
2 90 Id.
291 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
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forum. This assumption is consistent with the broad nature of the educational
enterprise, which is defined by an ongoing process of communication between
the students and their teachers, and the students and each other.
Moreover, by the Court's own terms, the public education system in our
culture is intended to teach students how to behave as citizens of a diverse
democracy. The opportunities for student interaction at school assemblies and in
common areas are a microcosm of the public sphere those same students will
soon inhabit in the larger society. As part of the process of acclimating students
to the public sphere, therefore, students should be taught three basic lessons:
think for yourself, feel free to criticize authority when necessary, and respect
the opinions of your opponents, no matter how offensive. Treating the non-
classroom environment of a public school as a public forum-and thereby
severely restricting the authority of school officials to regulate student
expression such as that in cases discussed above-is a much more logical way
to teach these very basic lessons of democratic citizenship. Aside from the
unacceptably authoritarian "civic education" arguments in cases like Fraser, the
only reasonable argument against this approach is that it is much more difficult
for teachers and principals to help students deal with the exercise of basic
liberties than it is to simply tell them to sit down and shut up. The response to
this argument is that if students are not taught how to deal with freedom at a
young age, it will be far more difficult to teach them the necessary civic skills
once they become full-fledged citizens.
I hasten to emphasize once more that the characterization of public schools
and universities as public forums under the interference analysis would not lead
to educational anarchy. As noted previously, an interference analysis would
permit control of expression in a classroom to the extent necessary to keep the
class focused on the relevant subject matter. Likewise, harmful or disruptive
behavior would remain subject to regulation. Also, the close confines and
peculiar dynamics of a school may permit a school's authorities to regulate
specific speech and symbols if the authorities can demonstrate as a matter of
fact that particular forms of expression have become instant flash-points
equivalent to traditional fighting words. But absent a context defined by an
immediate history of race riots or other disturbances instigated by particular
symbols, it would be impermissible for a school to outlaw (as a South Carolina
school system recently did) "the wearing or displaying of any symbol that
depicts heritage or race," 292 or broadly prohibit (as an Iowa school system
recently did) the wearing of "'[g]ang related.. . "colors," symbols, signals,
292 Mike Sith, Banner Combines Confederate Flag, Colors of Black Liberation,
ATLANTA CoNsT., Apr. 22, 1994, at A4.
19981 1595
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
signs, etc.' 2 93 And it certainly would be unconstitutional for school authorities
to regulate the student speech in the post-Fraser cases discussed earlier in this
section, where none of the school authorities could cite evidence that the
educational process was interfered with in any way. Once it is recognized that
schools should be treated more like parks than prisons, the fact that students
applaud and cheer a student council candidate is hardly the kind of disturbance
of public order that would justify the contravention of First Amendment rights.
IV. THE INTERFERENCE ANALYSIS AND "NEW" FORUMS:
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY PROGRAMS AS PUBLIC FORUMS
The cases discussed in the previous section all involve the traditional public
forum scenario: an individual seeks permission to speak on a piece of physical
property owned by the government that the government has closed to some or
all private expression. The interference analysis would alter the outcome of
many of these cases to permit much more expression than the current public
forum doctrine. The next two sections address the application of the
interference analysis to two factual scenarios involving "new" forums beyond
the traditional context of government-owned physical property: this section will
discuss government programs subsidizing speech, and the next section will
discuss government regulation of the Internet. In each of these contexts the
government has created an instrumentality of communication, which the
government has then sought to control through direct regulation of the types of
speech or speakers that are permitted to use the forum.
As in the more traditional public forum contexts, the application of a strong
public forum analysis would greatly enhance free speech protection in these
"new" forums. What follows is not a comprehensive analysis of all the issues
arising from government subsidies of speech or regulation of the Internet.
Rather, this is a preliminary effort to suggest a conceptual method of dealing
with new problems of expression in the public sphere, which have not been
addressed satisfactorily in current case law or academic writings. The
suggestions here are not entirely novel. As noted in Part II, supra, Justice
Kennedy's Rosenberger opinion treats one example of a government subsidy as
a public forum (although he ultimately rests his opinion on the First
Amendment prohibition of viewpoint discrimination).294 Likewise, the District
and Supreme Court opinions in ACLU v. Reno295-the most prominent case to
date on the subject of Internet regulation-are saturated with public forum
293 Stephenson v. Davenport Community Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1311 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding regulation unconstitutional on vagueness grounds).
294 See supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
295 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aft'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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overtones, and in effect treat the Internet as a sort of virtual public park.2 96 The
comments below elaborate on these suggestions, and draw from them the
beginnings of a systematic analytic framework for dealing with speech in these
new forums.
A. The Unsatisfactory Status Quo: The Distortions and Evasions of Rust
v. Sullivan
At first glance, applying the public forum doctrine to the subsidy cases
involves only a small, logical step. After all, the traditional public forum
doctrine asserts that government assets (such as a public park) must be set aside
for the expressive use of everyone in society, not just for those visitors whose
views coincide with those of the government. By analogy, why should public
assets in the form of money be treated any differently than a public asset in the
form of real property? The untrained eye may find the two classes of assets
difficult to distinguish for this purpose, but the courts have always been able to
do so easily. In the courts (with the notable exception of the Rosenberger
decision), the government has usually been permitted to allocate its money in a
general spending program however it wants-even if that allocation effectively
denies access to an entire category of speakers who have a distinctive point of
view on the same subject.
The Court's most definitive statement regarding First Amendment limits on
the allocation of government subsidies can be found in Rust v. Sullivan.297 In
Rust a five-member majority upheld speech-restrictive regulations promulgated
under Title X of the Public Health Service Act. 298 The Act provided federal
funding for family-planning services by local government and private non-profit
groups. The regulations challenged in the case included a broad provision
prohibiting any project receiving Title X money from "provid[ing] counseling
concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provid[ing]
referral for abortion as a method of family planning." 299 All recipients of Title
X funds-including doctors-were "expressly prohibited from referring a
pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even upon specific request. 300 The
regulations also prohibited Title X recipients from "encourag[ing], promot[ing],
or advocat[ing] abortion as a method of family planning" through lobbying
296 For a discussion of the public foram aspects of the Reno decisions, see infra notes
333-68 and accompanying text.
297 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
298 42 U.S.C. § 300 to 300a-41 (1994).
299 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1996).
300 Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
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efforts, distribution of literature, or other methods of disseminating
information. 301
These regulations were challenged on First Amendment grounds as
impermissible viewpoint regulations, since the regulations permitted (indeed,
encouraged) speech by Title X recipients about abortion alternatives, but
prohibited any favorable mention of abortion. The Court rejected this
argument: "IT]he Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint;
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. "302 The
problem is that the "activity" the government chose to fund was speech, and the
government's decision to fund only anti-abortion "activity" would have the
effect of forcing doctors receiving Title X funds to agree-either explicitly or
though enforced silence-with ideas that they vehemently oppose. The Court
blithely dismissed this problem with the conclusory statement that the doctors'
silence "cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the
doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her."303
The tone of Rust treats the plaintiffs' First Amendment complaints almost
as if such complaints could not be upheld without undermining the very purpose
of government subsidy programs. According to the Court, the communicative
distortions inherent in the Rust program were inevitable if the program's goals
were to be achieved: "[When the Government appropriates public funds to
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program." 304 In this
respect, Rust is analogous to the Court's limited public forum analysis: once we
move beyond the context of traditionally open public property, then the First
Amendment gives the government almost complete discretion to decide what
expression will be permitted on that property.
At the same time, the Court recognized that there are limits to the
government's discretion over the use of its subsidies. For example, the Court
recognized that government subsidies to universities are subject to stricter First
Amendment limits because "the university is a traditional sphere of free
expression [that is] ... fundamental to the functioning of our society." 30 5
Likewise, the Court noted that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine limits the
government's ability to impose speech-restrictive conditions on the expenditure
of government money, but the Court defined that doctrine narrowly to cover
only subsidy programs that "effectively prohibit[ed] the recipient from engaging
301 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1996).
302 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
303 Id. at 200.
304 Id. at 194.
305 Id. at 200 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S.
589, 605-06 (1967)).
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in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program." 306
Except for these two caveats, Rust removes most First Amendment obstacles to
the exclusive funding of the government's favored speakers and viewpoints.
Part II, supra, discusses Justice Kennedy's application of the public forum
doctrine to another subsidy program-the student activity fund at the University
of Virginia.307 The Court decided this case-Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the University of Virginia3 08-only four years after Rust. Despite the fact that
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion in Rosenberger, also joined
the majority opinion in Rust, the cases seem fundamentally inconsistent. In
particular, the implications of Justice Kennedy's characterization of the subsidy
program in Rosenberger as a "metaphysical" public forum309 contradict the
Court's extremely deferential treatment of the government's even more
ideologically distorted subsidy program in Rust.
In Rosenberger (as in Rust) the government had carefully constructed the
subsidy program to deny funding to one set of activities-among other things,
political and religious activities310-in order to fund a different set of
activities-i.e., extracurricular activities "'related to the educational purpose of
the University.' '3 11 Moreover, unlike the Rust program, which explicitly
denied subsidies to those expressing one point of view on a very specific public
policy debate, the University of Virginia program focused on the category of
speech-religion-without regard for whether the speaker wanted to use state
money to favor religion or to attack it.312 Thus, if anything, the Rosenberger
program was more compatible with the usual First Amendment rules than the
Rust program, which was upheld despite a First Amendment viewpoint-
discrimination challenge. Yet the Court struck down the University of Virginia
program at issue in Rosenberger as an unconstitutional viewpoint regulation of
speech, after rejecting a similar claim in Rust. On its face, therefore,
Rosenberger seems to call into question the Rust axiom that "when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to
define the limits of the program." 313
306 Id. at 197.
307 See supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
308 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
309 Id. at 830. For a discussion of this point, see supra notes 153-57 and accompanying
text.
310 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825.
311 Id. at 824.
312 See id. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that university program denied funding
"to Muslim and Jewish and Buddhist advocacy as well as to Christian.... [lt applies to
agnostics and atheists as well as it does to deists and theists").
313 Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
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Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy did not see things that way. In
Rosenberger, Kennedy attempted to distinguish Rust by focusing on the
government's intent in creating the respective programs. According to
Kennedy, in Rust "the government did not create a program to encourage
private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific information
pertaining to its own program." 314 Therefore, according to Kennedy, the public
forum model he applied in Rosenberger did not apply to Rust because Rust
involved the government's own speech. "When the government disburses
public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
distorted by the grantee. '315
There are several problems with Justice Kennedy's attempt to distinguish
the subsidy programs in Rust and Rosenberger. First, assuming that the
government's intent in creating a subsidy program is relevant to the First
Amendment analysis, Kennedy incorrectly identified conflicting governmental
purposes in Rust and Rosenberger. Contrary to Kennedy's interpretation of the
two subsidy programs, the basic government intent in both cases was identical:
in both programs the government created a subsidy program, but sought to
prevent money from that program from funding speech with which the
government either disagreed or did not want to be associated. In Rust the
government sought to avoid funding speech favoring abortion, and in
Rosenberger the government sought to avoid funding any speech that was not
"'related to the educational purpose of the University of Virginia.' ' 316 Because
314 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 824. In contrast to my blunt synopsis of the government policy in Rust and
Rosenberger, the Court chose to engage in a Talmudic interpretation of the motivations for
the relevant policies to achieve the majority's desired results. Even if one ignores the obvious
effects of the two statutes and attempts to discern some subtle intent in these cases, the Court
probably got it wrong. That is, a plausible case could be made that the Court misinterpreted
the government's intent in both Rust and Rosenberger.
With regard to Rust, the Court may have misinterpreted the motivations for the relevant
government policy when it concluded that the government intended to convey a particular
message through private speakers. The case involved a series of regulations implementing
Title X of the Public Health Service Act. The regulations issued by the Department of Health
and Human Services contained the restrictions on speech, but the statute itself did not. By the
Rust majority's own admission, Title X "does not speak directly to the issues of counseling,
referral, advocacy, or program integrity," Rust, 500 U.S. at 184, the legislative history on the
subject "is ambiguous and fails to shed light on relevant constitutional intent," id. at 185, and
the clear thnist of the statute is to provide funds for nonexpressive activities (i.e., health
services). It is therefore not at all clear that the regulations restricting speech advocating
abortion accurately reflected Congress's intent to use "private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to [the government's] own program." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
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the government desired to avoid funding disfavored speech in both cases, it
seems logical that the outcome of the Court's First Amendment analysis in the
two cases should have also been the same. If the government's intent to avoid
funding certain speech was respected in Rust, the same intent should have been
respected in Rosenberger.
The second problem with Kennedy's attempt to distinguish Rust and
Rosenberger is that it relies on government intent at all. In his public forum
opinions, Kennedy himself has shown why government intent is an
inappropriate guidepost for judicial review of a program that restricts speech.
As Kennedy has noted, using the government's intent regarding its preferred
uses for a piece of public property to determine whether private speech is
permissible on that property "leaves the government with almost unlimited
authority to restrict speech ... by doing nothing more than articulating a non-
speech-related purpose for the area." 317 The same analysis that Kennedy finds
so compelling in the physical property context also applies logically to the
public subsidy cases. The type of property is different, but the principle is the
same: if the government is using public money to create an instrumentality of
communication, then that instrumentality should be made available to all
speakers, without regard to whether the government likes what the speakers
might say. Otherwise, the government can avoid its First Amendment
obligation to refrain from content and viewpoint regulation of speech simply by
saying flatly that only speakers agreeing with the government need apply for
public money.
An even more plausible case could be made that the Court misinterpreted the
government policy in Rosenberger. Contrary to Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the
University of Virginia intended to subsidize "a diversity of views" when it created the student
activity fund, id. at 834, the university unambiguously stated in the relevant policy that none
of the money in the fund should be used for any religious or political activity, including
speech. Id. at 825. Moreover, the university stated explicitly that it would fund only those
extracurricular activities that "'are related to the educational purpose of the University of
Virginia.'" Id. at 824. This linkage of the funded student activities to the university's own
objectives makes the fund akin to the student newspaper in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), in which the Court held schools may regulate "student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 273.
Therefore, if one ignores the obvious thrust of both the Rust and Rosenberger policies to
limit speech, in favor of Justice Kennedy's preferred method of minutely parsing the
government's intent, the Court probably should have reached the opposite results in both Rust
and Rosenberger.
317 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The third problem with Kennedy's analysis of Rust and Rosenberger is his
assumption that the government's authority to speak on matters of public policy
necessarily gives the government the power to amplify its "voice" by dictating
the speech of private individuals and groups paid by the government through a
public subsidy program. The first part of Kennedy's assumption is indisputable:
certainly the government may express its point of view on any matter of public
policy. Indeed, creating public policy, informing the public about the policy's
content, and defending the policy against political opponents is the central
purpose of a democratic government. But extending the capacity of the
government to control speech beyond the narrow confines of the government
itself-that is, beyond the agencies of government, individuals who are elected
members of the government, or employees of the government speaking on the
government's behalf-is neither necessary to the process of governing nor
consistent with the democratic premise that no government can use its general
policymaking authority to suppress or overwhelm its opposition and thereby
perpetuate its control of the government indefinitely.
It is crucial to remember that references to speech by "the government" are
really references to the speech of whatever political faction happened to capture
control of the government at the last election. One of the primary purposes of
the First Amendment is to ensure that the political faction that won the last
election does not abuse the legitimate power it obtains from that victory to
manipulate the results of the next election. Therefore, it is necessary to impose
strict limits on any victorious faction's ability to "speak" on behalf of the
government.
The Court has already recognized several First Amendment limitations on
the government's authority to use its control over public resources to suppress
speech with which the government disagrees. The most prominent example of
these limitations apply when the government seeks to regulate the independent
speech of its own employees. For example, the Court has prohibited the
government from imposing political affiliation requirements on
nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employees. 318 The Court has
also prohibited the government from limiting speech by public employees
opposing government policy regarding matters of public concern, so long as the
employee's speech does not disrupt the effective operation of the workplace. 319
Likewise, the traditional public forum doctrine prevents the government from
suppressing speech in a public park despite the fact-indeed, because of the
fact-that the government owns the park. The government's ability to use its
318 See Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 520 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976).
319 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987); Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968).
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control over public assets to infuse the citizenry with a uniform view of public
policy must be limited in order to protect the First Amendment model of
constant political flux. In our constitutional system, any political faction's
control over public assets must be considered temporary, and the First
Amendment demands that dissenters to the current regime must have access to
the expressive use of those assets to the same extent as the government's
acolytes and apologists, so long as universal access to those assets does not
significantly interfere with the nonexpressive operations of the government.
Justice Kennedy's deference to the government's desire to control private
expression using public assets in cases such as Rust would undercut the liberal
rules of broad access to public resources Kennedy describes in his public forum
opinions. Justice Kennedy's notion that the government may restrict private use
of public resources by taking "legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that
[the government's] message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee" 320
has no logical stopping.point short of Holmes's harsh principle that citizens
"have a constitutional right to talk politics, but ... no constitutional right to be
a policeman"321 (which follows from the same logic that led Holmes to defend
the common law conception of the public park as property completely under the
control of its owner-the government322). Kennedy's public forum opinions
explicitly renounce the repressive implications of the ownership model of
government control over public resources, and thus are deeply inconsistent with
his defense of the Court's equally restrictive result in Rust.
In recent years, the Supreme Court's protection of public access to public
property has been imperfect, but at least for the last fifty years or so the Court
has refused to embrace Holmes's all-encompassing view of the government's
authority to control private speech by controlling the disposition of public
resources. Moreover, to embrace such a concept in a world where the
government's tentacles reach into almost every aspect of daily life would
eviscerate the most basic First Amendment guarantees.
The better way of handling these problems would be to take Justice
Kennedy's notion of a "metaphysical" public forum seriously, and apply the
interference analysis to public subsidy cases as well as the more traditional
physical-property public forum disputes. As noted in the next subsection, this
would protect the speech of government antagonists far more effectively than
the Rust standard, while preserving the government's ability to make policy and
articulate its positions publicly.
320 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
321 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
322 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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B. Government Subsidies as Public Forums: The Application of the
Interference Analysis
Slight modifications to the interference analysis would be necessary when
applying it to the subsidy context, but the basic outline of the analysis would
remain the same. In short, the interference analysis would apply to any
"instrumentality of communication" created by the government. An
instrumentality of communication would therefore be equivalent to what Justice
Kennedy's Rosenberger opinion termed a "metaphysical" public forum.323
Difficulties would obviously arise in determining whether a particular
government subsidy program constitutes an instrumentality of communication.
These difficulties will be addressed in more detail infra, but in brief a public
subsidy program constitutes an instrumentality of communication if the program
facilitates the dissemination of information or ideas. The programs in Rust and
Rosenberger provide clear examples of programs that would fall into this
category because both programs expressly provided government funds for
private expression in the form of printed and verbal communication.
Any public subsidy program that is deemed an instrumentality of
communication would be subject to the interference standard. Under this
standard, the government would be prohibited from imposing any restrictions
on the private expressive use of public subsidies unless such expression would
significantly and directly interfere with the legitimate nonexpressive operations
of the government. The government would be unlikely to satisfy this standard
in either Rust or Rosenberger because there was no indication in either case that
the elimination of expressive restrictions in the subsidy programs at issue in
those cases would have prevented the respective governments from acting on
their own to provide social services (in Rust) or conduct university business (in
Rosenberger). In Rust, for example, even if Title X family planning money was
provided to doctors associated with Planned Parenthood or other pro-choice
groups, and even if those doctors used that money to inform their patients about
the availability of abortion services, the government's ability to provide social
services under its own terms (including the denial of publicly funded abortions)
would be unaffected. 324 The possibility that expression financed by public funds
323 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
324 This conclusion is consistent with Robert Post's argument that the government
should be permitted to engage in viewpoint regulation of expression only if the government
program in which that regulation occurs falls within the government's "managerial domain."
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996). Thus, Post argues, Rust
would be defensible if the Tide X regulations at issue in that case were "located within the
boundaries of a managerial regime dedicated to the achievement of legitimate ends." Id. at
170. This was not the case in Rust, Post emphasizes, because "[i]t is far from clear... that
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could lead to public opposition to the government's policies would not
constitute "interference" under the interference analysis.
325
physicians, even if they have accepted employment in Title X clinics, occupy roles defined by
reference to a purely organizational logic, particularly in situations where that logic seeks to
override the necessary exercise of independent professional judgment." Id. at 173.
325 The most thoughtful article concerning constitutional limits on subsidized speech
regulation reaches many of the same results I am seeking here, but by a very different route.
See David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992). Professor Cole seeks to limit
the government's authority to control the subsidized speech of private individuals and groups
by defining several "spheres of neutrality" in which government subsidies would be subject to
the First Amendment mandate of governmental neutrality over content, viewpoint, and
speaker identity. See id. at 716-17. Examples of "spheres of neutrality" include traditional
public forums, id. at 717, public universities, id. at 723, the press, id. at 731, the arts, id. at
739, and professional fiduciary counseling, id. at 743. Cole argues that these spheres of
human activity require a large degree of freedom from government control to operate
effectively, thus government control over those using public assets in these areas should be
strictly limited. Cole also suggests an analytic framework for evaluating when limitations on
public subsidies are appropriate. Cole's framework considers three factors that focus on the
government's role in fostering public debate, the nature of the government's internal
operations, and the degree to which unrestricted expression would impede the relevant
institution's internal operations. Id. at 736-38. Much of what Cole says about his analysis is
consistent with the interference analysis proposed in this Article, and the results reached in
cases analyzed under the two standards would usually be identical.
Despite the strong similarities between the two standards, I believe the interference
analysis is superior to Cole's "spheres of neutrality" analysis for three reasons. First, the
discussion of public subsidies in the text accompanying this note is merely one aspect of a
much larger reconfiguration of public forum law, the present state of which Cole accurately
describes as "one of the most confused and widely-criticized doctrines of first amendment
law." Id. at 718-19. Thus, the interference analysis would provide a much broader
foundation for strong protection of subsidized speech. Second, the interference analysis is less
complicated than Cole's three-part analysis, and would therefore provide fewer opportunities
for the government to balance away the First Amendment interest in any particular subsidy
case. Third, to the extent that Cole's standard depends on the Supreme Court's endorsement
of certain spheres of neutrality, the standard stands on a weak foundation. As the discussion in
previous sections of this Article indicate, two of the "spheres of neutrality" cited by Cole-the
public forum and public universities-are very vulnerable to governmental attacks on
dissenting speech under the Court's current doctrine. See supra notes 17-98 and
accompanying text (detailing flaws in current public forum doctrine); supra note 281 and
accompanying text (noting that Court's adherence to strong protection of free speech in the
educational context is vulnerable to the uncertain applicability of Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), in the university context).
In any event, Cole's focus on an institutional analysis is very helpful in areas of First
Amendment analysis that lie beyond the scope of the public forum doctrine. In particular,
Cole's analysis clearly defines the constitutional limits that should apply to the government's
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A few clarifications and a slight modification to the interference analysis
are necessary as a preemptive response to three anticipated objections to
treating government subsidy programs as public forums. The first objection is
that the interference analysis outlined above potentially would require every
government expenditure to be matched by a subsidy for the speech of
opponents'to that expenditure, thus severely inhibiting the government's ability
to carry out any political policy.
This objection can be answered by underscoring the limitations inherent in
the definition of the interference analysis as applied in the subsidy context. Most
public appropriations would not be considered public forums under the analysis
proposed here because most appropriations do not create instrumentalities of
communication. Thus, the most common public spending programs-including
those funding the public safety or social service operations of government-
would not even come under the analysis proposed here. Thus, anti-tax groups
would not be able to claim a First Amendment subsidy simply because the
government has chosen to fund the Internal Revenue Service.
The second potential objection, which is derived from Justice Kennedy's
argument in Rosenberger defending the Court's Rust decision,326 asserts that if
all government programs relating- to the communication of ideas are subject to
constitutional public forum constraints, then the government itself will never be
able to speak in a uniform voice to the citizenry. As Justice Kennedy argues,
"when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy
of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. 327 If all government spending for
the communication of information creates First Amendment rights under the
public forum doctrine, the argument goes, then the government would be
required to offer money to the American Friends Service Committee (and every
other anti-war group) every time the United States Army spends money to
advertise for new recruits.
This objection, like the first, lacks merit because even if the government
does fund a program that involves pure expression-such as a public
information campaign, in which the government prints and distributes literature
ability to impose restrictions on the expressive activities of governmental and quasi-
governmental actors such as Legal Services Corporation attorneys. (First Amendment
restrictions on these activities would not come under the modified public forum analysis
proposed here, because the public forum doctrine applies only where the government is
attempting to control speech by private actors. See suqra note 323.) For another argument that
recent restrictions on Legal Services attorneys violate the First Amendment, see Recent
Legislation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1346 (1997).
326 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832-35.
327 Id. at 833.
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taking a position on some political, moral, or social issue-the interference
analysis proposed here would not apply. To this extent the interference analysis
is in accord with Justice Kennedy's notion that if the government itself wants to
promote some policy, then it is entitled to say what it wishes.328 But unlike
Justice Kennedy's broad application of this axiom to justify Rust, the analysis
proposed here would insulate government speech from First Amendment limits
only when the government itself is speaking-i.e., agencies, officials, or
employees speaking on behalf of government. On the other hand, if the
government tries to extend its influence by paying for the speech of private
actors-i.e., groups or individuals who are not formally part of the
government-then the interference analysis would apply and the government
would be required to provide subsidies to speakers opposing the government's
policies.
The third possible objection to the application of the interference analysis in
the subsidy context rejects the analogy proposed here between physical and
metaphysical forums. One key difference between the two types of forums
presents a particular problem: if, as asserted in Part II supra,329 the government
cannot limit the permissible types of expression in a particular forum, how will
the government be able to focus subsidy programs on specific areas of need
(grants to artists or family planning programs, for example) without violating
the First Amendment rules proposed here? Under the interference analysis, the
category of "limited public forums" would be eliminated in favor of a
straightforward assessment of whether expression would, in fact, interfere with
the government's use of a specific piece of public property. If this analysis were
applied directly to a public subsidy program, every program subsidizing speech
would be vulnerable to First Amendment claims attempting to broaden the
scope of the subsidy program beyond the parameters set in the statute. After all,
if (as argued in Part III supra33O) a school system cannot limit the use of a
physical forum-for example, school mailboxes-to expression relating to
school business, why should the government be able to limit a metaphysical
forum such as a subsidy program to expression about one subject, such as art or
family planning? Ironically, the direct application of an unmodified interference
analysis to public subsidy programs might doom public financing of art and
family planning because no subsidy program could be confined to the targeted
subject.
The third anticipated objection presents the most difficult obstacle for the
application of the interference analysis to subsidy programs. This objection
328 See id.
329 See supra notes 158-75 and accompanying text.
330 See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
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requires a modification of the interference analysis to permit the government to
define, in very broad terms, the field covered by a particular subsidy statute.
Thus, the government could focus a subsidy program on "art," for example, or
even on "sculpture," without being subject to a First Amendment challenge.
This modification takes into account the need to limit the scope of a public
subsidy statute, in the same way that the physical boundaries of a public park
bracket the application of the public forum doctrine to a physical forum. The
boundaries of a public park or other physical forum are clear to any observer.
But the boundaries of a subsidy program are defined by the statutory scheme
itself. In this context, limitations on the field covered by a statute would be
analogous to the physical boundaries of a park. Thus, the interference analysis
would permit the government to restrict the field covered by a subsidy
program, but not the content of expression that takes place within that field.
Applying this analysis to a particular subsidy program will involve the
exercise of more subtle judgments than are necessary in defining the scope of a
physical forum. It would also involve a slight retreat from the principle stated in
Part II, supra, that the government should not be permitted to define a limited
public forum by imposing narrow subject matter restrictions on speech on
public property. With regard to subsidy programs, the government would be
permitted to define the coverage of the subsidy by reference to a specific
subject matter ("family planning" or "art"), but to ensure protection of First
Amendment values, the government's definition of a field covered by a subsidy
statute must be stated in very general terms.
The line between the permissible definition of a "field" covered by a
subsidy program and impermissible limits placed on the content of speech
within that field will not always be obvious. But most subsidy statutes that run
afoul of the interference analysis will involve clear-cut governmental efforts to
use public resources to distort communication by favoring some ideas and
disfavoring others. The statute upheld in Rust is one obvious example. The
recent Congressional effort to deny public subsidies to offensive art is another.
Under the interference analysis, such efforts would be virtually impossible to
justify. Congress would be permitted to establish a subsidy program for "art,"
but it would not be permitted to create a program funding only "decent art."
Decency requirements on art subsidies, such as those imposed by recent
amendments to statutes funding the National Endowment for the Arts, 331 do not
331 Te so-called "decency amendment" to the NF'A statute required the Chairperson of
the Endowment to "tak[e] into consideratiQn general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American people" when establishing regulations and
procedures for issuing grants. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990). This provision was declared
unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on vagueness grounds, and because the
provision constituted an impermissible regulation of the content and viewpoint of artistic
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define a field of discourse; rather, such limitations are an attempt to distort
public discourse by channeling expression about a particular subject in a
direction favored by the government. 332 Preventing governmental distortions of
public discourse is one of the primary objectives of the public forum doctrine,
and has routinely been used to limit the government's ability to ban offensive
speech from traditional public forums; the interference analysis would simply
apply the same constitutional objective to public subsidies.
In the end, the application of the First Amendment to public subsidy
programs seems to be an all or nothing affair. That is, either the government
can dictate precisely what recipients of public subsidies can say (the Rust
model), or the government can dictate nothing to the speakers it subsidizes
(assuming no interference with the government's nonexpressive activities),
beyond defining very broadly the category of speech that is being subsidized
(the model proposed here). There is no logical middle ground because any
effort to devise half-measure constitutional protections of subsidized speech will
begin by accepting the central premise that funds distributed as a subsidy are,
after all, the government's money. Once it is conceded that the government
"owns" the money, the government is likely to win most disputes over how that
money is ultimately used. The interference analysis denies government control
over the use of public funds for expression, but does so under a system that
preserves legitimate governmental prerogatives. Under the interference
analysis, the government retains the authority to speak on public issues-it
simply must do so with internal governmental resources, using public agencies
and employees acting in their official capacity. Likewise, the government can
always end a subsidy altogether if those in power are sufficiently traumatized by
speech. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 1997 WL 561768 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1997). The Court skirted the problems posed by
Rust by declaring artistic speech a "traditional sphere of free expression" (like universities)
and by citing the government's intent to encourage a diversity of viewpoints, A la
Rosenberger. See id. at 681-82.
332 The interference analysis also casts doubt upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Regan v. Tawation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), involving the government's
selective grant of tax exemptions for lobbying by charitable organizations (a form of subsidy
which, since it is designed to facilitate the expression of recipients, would be governed by the
interference analysis). The statute upheld in Regan denied tax exemptions to all charitable
groups engaged in lobbying, except veterans' groups. Id. at 546 & n.8. In Regan, the field of
expression was lobbying, and Congress chose to discriminate within that field between
veterans groups and all other charitable organizations. Eliminating the distinction between
speakers (either by broadening the scope of the exemption to cover all charitable lobbying, or
by eliminating the special preference for veterans) would not interfere in any significant way
with governmental operations; therefore, the policy upheld in Regan violates the interference
analysis.
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the notion of subsidizing antagonistic speech, just as the government can sell the
land constituting a public park if hostile political demonstrations in that space
make the government sufficiently uncomfortable. The government loses nothing
under this standard, other than what it did not have in the first place-the
authority to dictate how private speakers use public assets.
V. THE INTERFERENCE ANALYSIS AND "NEW" FoRUMS: GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
In the summer of 1997, on the last day of its 1996-1997 Term, the
Supreme Court issued its first comprehensive opinion dealing with government
regulation of the Internet. The majority opinion in Reno v. ACLU,333 which
held unconstitutional major provisions of the Communications Decency Act (the
"CDA"),334 provides a broad endorsement of free speech in cyberspace. Much
of the opinion is devoted to expansive descriptions of how the Internet has
increased the possibilities of human communication beyond anything
imaginable only a few years ago. This opinion-which in many respects reflects
the even more enthusiastic endorsements of an unrestricted Internet by the
three-judge district court panel in the case335-goes a long way toward
solidifying the constitutional protection of speech in cyberspace, but it leaves
several issues unresolved. First, the Court notes (although it does not endorse)
several less-restrictive means of regulating indecent speech over the Internet, 336
leaving open the possibility that Congress will pass a series of new "baby
CDA's" in the coming years. Second, the opinion does nothing to resolve
conflicts over computer use at public institutions, especially universities, where
disputes have multiplied with the expansion of the Internet and the World Wide
Web. Finally, Reno focuses on the problems of regulating the access of minors
to sexual speech, an area in which the Court has traditionally given the
government substantial regulatory leeway, even in restricting speech that is
legal for adults. Because the Reno opinion is focused on this fairly specialized
regulatory problem, it does not address other censorship efforts that do not
involve the protection of minors, such as the recent effort by the State of
Georgia to prohibit the use of pseudonyms in communication over the
Internet. 337
333 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
334 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (1997).
335 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
336 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
337 See infra note 400 and accompanying text.
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The Internet is still in its infancy, and the inevitable governmental efforts to
control or sanitize the frequently anarchic world of cyberspace have only
begun. This section suggests that the clear characterization of the Internet as a
public forum will aid in the resolution of conflicts between government
regulators and speakers which are bound to proliferate as the expansion of
communication in cyberspace continues. Given the novelty of Internet
regulation, it is possible to sketch only a preliminary and tentative overview of
the consequences of deeming the Internet a public forum. But in at least one
arena where disputes are already common-i.e., clashes between administrators
and students using computers at a public university-the application of public
forum principles would have an immediate and salutary effect.
A. The Roots of Reno: The Internet as a Public Forum
It does not require much creativity to characterize the Internet as a public
forum after the Supreme Court's Reno decision. Indeed, it is not unreasonable
to suggest that the Reno majority opinion itself treats the Internet as a public
forum without actually making the designation explicit. This is evident from the
uniformly skeptical stance the Court took toward any regulation of expressive
content on the Internet and also from the Court's express refusal to analogize
the Internet to relatively closed electronic forums involving broadcast or cable
communications, which receive lower levels of constitutional protection than
private speech in more traditional public forums.
Prior to Reno it was possible that the Court would open the door to
extensive government regulation of the Internet by conceptualizing the Internet
as merely a slight extension of other electronic media such as radio, television,
or cable. The government argued in Reno in favor of such an analogy, and
even asserted that there "is a stronger justification" to regulate the Internet than
there is to regulate broadcasting because "the indecency problem on the Internet
is much more pronounced than it is on broadcast stations." 338 This was not
simply an academic debate over legal taxonomy; if the broadcast model had
prevailed in Reno, almost every aspect of speech on the Internet would be
subject to extensive and potentially debilitating government regulation. 339
338 Brief for Appellants at 28-29, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-
511).
339 In the broadcast sphere, the Court has permitted the government to restrict speech
the broadcaster wants to broadcast, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(restricting broadcast of indecent programming), and also to force broadcasters to carry
speech that they do not want to broadcast, see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (upholding fairness doctrine, which requires broadcasters to carry responses to
personal attacks or editorials involving political candidates). The Court has upheld the
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The debate over the applicability of the broadcast model to the Internet
mirrors many of the disputes that have arisen over the use of government
property in the public forum cases. Indeed, much of the Court's doctrine
regarding radio and television rests on the premise that the government may
regulate private broadcasters because the private broadcasters are using a public
asset-i.e., the airwaves. Thus, in the broadcast regulation context, as in the
public forum context, the central issue is whether the government can use its
ownership of the expressive asset to control what the government considers
immoral, antisocial, or politically antagonistic speech.
The basic theory permitting extensive government regulation of radio and
television can be found in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.340 In that case,
the Court approved the Federal Conununications Commission (FCC) "Fairness
Doctrine," which required broadcasters to give response time to candidates who
have been editorially opposed by the broadcaster, or who have been subjected
to other "personal attacks" on the air.341 The Court upheld the doctrine as
applied to broadcasters on the theory that the allocation of broadcast frequencies
used by radio and television stations involves the "enforced sharing of a scarce
resource." 342 Two complementary assumptions are combined in this phrase: the
conception of broadcast frequencies as a public resource, and the
characterization of that resource as scarce and therefore subject to governmental
allocation. Broadcasters are viewed in Red Lion not as aggressively independent
members of the Fourth Estate, 343 but rather as public agents of civic education,
application of similar restrictions to cable television companies, see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) (upholding "must carry" rules requiring cable operators to
carry signals of local broadcast stations), although the Court uses a somewhat more stringent
standard for content-neutral government regulations of cable than for similar regulations of
broadcasting. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-41 (1994). The
precise nature of that standard is unclear. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1996) (refusing to make "definitive choice among
competing analogies (broadcast, common carrier, bookstore)" and avoiding any "specific set
of words" to define standard applicable to regulations of cable programming content). It is
equally unclear whether the Court will permit the government to regulate indecent
programming on cable as extensively as indecency in broadcast media. See id. at 2392
(striking down statutory requirement that cable companies segregate indecent programming on
a single, blocked channel and require anyone wanting access to that channel to file a written
request, but noting several other less restrictive statutory provisions that have the effect of
segregating indecent cable programming).
340 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
341 Id. at 373-75.
342 Id. at 391.
343 This role was left to traditional print journalism, to which the Court refused to extend
the scarcity/public resource arguments it accepted in RedLion. See Mian Herald v. Tornillo,
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which to a large extent can be guided and controlled by the government. "It
does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of
using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to
give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern."344
In FCC v. Pacifica Broadcasting,345 the Court added a third item to its two
Red Lion rationales for permitting extensive regulation of broadcasting. In
Pacifica, the Court held that the FCC could prohibit "indecent" radio
broadcasts346 during certain periods of the day because broadcasting receives
only "the most limited" level of free speech protection.347 According to the
Court, radio and television broadcasting is "a uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all Americans," 348 which "confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of the intruder. 349 Therefore,
the government could regulate the content of broadcasts to shift potentially
offensive programming to a time when listeners would be unlikely to encounter
it inadvertently.
The Court's assumptions about the need to regulate the broadcast media
have been subjected to criticism ever since the Court issued its Red Lion
decision. 350 Today, those early criticisms have been overtaken by the empirical
418 U.S. 241 (1974) (unanimously striking down state "right of reply" statute, which gave
candidates a right to reply to political attacks in newspaper).
344 RedLion, 395 U.S. at 394.
345 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
346 "Indecency" was defined as "nonconformance with accepted standards of morality."
Id. at 439-40. The specific "nonconformance" at issue in Pacifica was, of course, George
Carlin's comedy routine concerning the notorious "seven dirty words." See id. at 751, 755.
3 4 7 Id. at 748.
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. Cm. L. 1Ev. 20 (1975) (arguing that further regulation of broadcast journalism will
encourage existing tendencies toward editorial blandness); L.A. Powe, Jr., Or of the
[Broadcast] Press, 55 Thx. L. Rsv. 39 (1976) (criticizing scarcity argument); William W.
Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.
L. REv. 539 (1978) (criticizing regulation of broadcasting as inconsistent with First
Amendment principle of editorial freedom). The most compelling criticism of the Court's
assumptions in Pacifica is contained in Justice Brennan's vociferous dissent. See Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Aside from chiding the majority for their "figile
ensibilities" and "acute ethnocentric myopia," id. at 775, Brennan used the imagery of the
)ublic forum to rebut the Court's description of radio's unwanted intrusion into the sanctity of
ie home. "[A]n individual's actions in switching on and listening to communications
ansmitted over the public airways and directed to the public at large ... are more properly
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facts of technological development. The rapid expansion of cable, satellite, and
computer media has undercut the scarcity logic of Red Lion. Indeed, in 1985
the FCC itself issued a report renouncing the Fairness Doctrine and the scarcity
theory on which it was based, and subsequently abolished the Doctrine.351
Nevertheless, some scholars have used the broad analysis of Red Lion to
argue that the entire First Amendment should be revamped to permit more
government regulation of private speech in order to counterbalance the
predominance of speech that they consider unenlightening or antisocial.352
Ironically, these proposals, which are premised on politically progressive
objectives such as the need to foster equality, ultimately depend on the very
conservative assumptions of governmental ownership and control of the public
sphere that were used to uphold strict (and decidedly unprogressive) restrictions
on private speech in public forums prior to Hague v. C.L 0. 353 When the Court
rejected these assumptions in Hague, it recognized that the logic of government
ownership and control over expressive resources is deeply incompatible with
modem notions of democratic limits on government control of popular thought
and expression.
viewed as a decision to take part, if only as a listener, in an ongoing public discourse." Id. at
764-65.
351 "MIhe growth of traditional broadcast facilities" and "the development of new
electronic information technologies" have rendered "the fairness doctrine unnecessary."
Report Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 143, 197 (1985). Thus, the FCC abolished the Fairness Doctrine, concluding that it
no longer served the public interest and that it violated the First Amendment. See Syracuse
Peace Council v. WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. '5043 (1987). The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the
agency's determination. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
352 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Stricture, 71 IoWA L. REV. 1405,
1416 (1986) (using Red Lion to support theory that free speech tradition should be modified to
permit more government intervention "to safeguard the conditions for true and free collective
self-determination"); Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YA L...
1757, 1760 (1995) (citing Red Lion as an example of "Madisonian model" of First
Amendment, under which "governmental efforts to encourage diverse views and attention to
public issues are compatible with the free speech principle-even if they result in regulatory
controls on the owners of speech sources"); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 620 ("The reasoning in Red Lion Broadcasting Company
v. FCC... suggests that in some circumstances government regulation may be
constitutionally acceptable, or perhaps even constitutionally compelled, in the interest of
equalization and diversity."). For an analysis of the many problems with these other recent
interventionist theories of free speech jurisprudence, see Steven G. Gey, The Case Against
Postmodem Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 193 (1996).
353 307 U.S. 496 (1939); see supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
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In any event, the Court has never taken the advice of commentators who
would have'the Court expand the application of Red Lion and its progeny;
instead, the Red Lion doctrine has been limited to broadcasting. The narrow
scope of the broadcasting cases is evident throughout the Reno decision, in
which the Court uses the very specific context of the Red Lion and Pacifica
cases to thwart the government's effort to extend the regulatory rationale of
those cases to the Internet. The Court found that Red Lion was of little use to
the government because the scarcity rationale does not apply to the Internet.
"[U]nlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized
regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a
'scarce' expressive commodity." 354 Although the exponential growth of the
Internet periodically threatens to outstrip presently available bandwidth, there is
no physical limit on the amount of additional capacity that can be added to take
account of the medium's future growth. As the Court recognized, the Internet
"provides relatively unlimited, low cost capacity for communication of all
kinds. 355
Pacifica proved equally unhelpful to the government in Reno, even though
the two cases involved similar restrictions on the transmission of "indecent"
materials.356 Ironically, it was the government's earlier success in focusing the
Court's attention on inadvertent listeners to offensive broadcasts that undercut
the usefulness of Pacifica in the Internet case. In contrast to broadcast media,
the Court held in Reno, "the Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio or
television .... 'Users seldom encounter content by accident.... [and the]
odds are slim that a user would come across a sexually explicit sight by
accident."' 35 7 Besides, the Court held, unlike broadcasting, the Internet has not
historically been subject to government regulation, and unlike the Paciflca
regulation, the Reno statute provided for a complete ban on the targeted speech,
rather than a time, place, or manner relegation of the speech to a late-night time
period. 358
Emphasizing the differences between broadcasting and the Internet gave the
Court several opportunities to characterize the Internet in a way most favorable
354 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
355 Id.
356 Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act were held unconstitutional in
Reno. The first prohibited the knowing transmission of indecent materials to any recipient
under 18 years of age. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (1997). The second prohibited the knowing
sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to any
recipient under 18 years of age. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (1997).
357 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
358 See id. at 2342-43.
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to strong First Amendment protection, and equally conducive to treating the
Internet as a new, metaphysical public forum. The Court described the Internet
as "vast democratic fora," 359 whose content "'is as diverse as human
thought.'" 360 Moreover, the Court noted, the growth of the Internet seems to
confirm that the public is attracted, rather than repulsed, by the diversityof
available ideas in the new forum. In a phrase that directly contradicts the
interventionist thrust of Red Lion and the other broadcast cases, the Court
reaffirmed the central First Amendment principle that operates outside the
idiosyncratic area of broadcasting: "[W]e presume that government regulation
of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of
ideas than to encourage it. 361
This assumption is consistent with the Court's protection of expressive
diversity in traditional public forums, and many of the metaphors and
precedents cited by the Court to support its assumption were drawn from public
forum jurisprudence. In describing communication over the Internet, the Court
invoked the image of a virtual Hyde Park Comer: "Through the use of Web
pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer." 362 Likewise, in rejecting the government's argument that the
Internet could be regulated as long as other means of communication remained
open, the Court drew an analogy to the traditional protection afforded to
leafleters on sidewalks and cited for support one of the Court's oldest public
forum decisions. "The Government's position is equivalent to arguing that a
statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as individuals are free to
publish books. In invalidating a number of laws that banned leafleting on the
streets regardless of their content-we explained that 'one is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place.' "363
Although the Supreme Court did not use precisely the same words, the
tenor of its opinion echoes District Court Judge Dalzell's characterization of the
Internet as "the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this
country-and indeed the world-has yet seen," 364 as well as Dalzell's
conclusion that because of its unique character "the Internet deserves the
359 Id. at 2343.
3 60 Id. at 2344 (quoting Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842).
361 Id. at 2351.
362 Id. at 2344.
363 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348-49 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
364 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 881.
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broadest possible protection from government-imposed, content-based
regulation. 365
In light of the strong pro-speech language in Reno, there seems little to add
in the way of constitutional protection for the Internet. Yet despite its repeated
inferences and allusions to public forum principles and precedents, the Court
did not definitively assert that the Internet will henceforth be treated as a public
forum. This is significant because the Reno majority opinion left open at least
the theoretical possibility that it might uphold content-based regulations of the
Internet that were narrower than the CDA,366 and the separate opinion of
Justice O'Connor specifically endorsed the notion that the government could
constitutionally "zone" low-value speech within the Internet once the
technology to do so becomes available. 367 These options, although less
comprehensively restrictive than the CDA, would nevertheless pose the same
type of threat to the anarchic freedom of the Internet that the Reno majority
seems intent on preserving. Also, as noted at the beginning of this section, the
Reno decision does not address regulation of speech outside the sexual arena,
where protection of children gives the government a justification that does not
apply to other types of expressive content. Finally, Reno provides little
guidance for dealing with government efforts to regulate the expression of
citizens using government facilities to access the Internet, a problem that has
already arisen several times in the context of public universities and libraries.
Therefore, despite the strong protection of speech provided by the Court's
Reno opinion, that opinion leaves open several possibilities for regulation that
state and federal governments will sooner or later attempt to use (and in some
cases discussed infra, have already used) to restrict expression on the Internet.
The public forum doctrine, filtered through the interference analysis proposed
in this Article, would strengthen the Reno holding by providing a speech-
favorable framework for analysis of future regulations, and thereby come close
to realizing Judge Dalzell's goal of providing "the broadest possible protection
from government-imposed, content-based regulation." 368 The next subsection
provides a brief consideration of how the public forum analysis would
contribute to the analysis of three problems relating to regulation of the Internet
beyond the CDA.
365 Id.
3 66 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
367 See id. at 2352-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
368 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 881.
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B. Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Regulation of the Internet as a
Public Forum
Reno turns out to have been an easy case for advocates of free speech in
cyberspace. But the statute in Reno was a particularly clumsy first effort by the
government to regulate the Internet: the CDA was far too broad, too vague,
enacted without any legislative hearings or findings, and at the last minute was
tacked onto a much more comprehensive telecommunications statute that had
nothing to do with the regulation of speech on the Internet.369 Having lost the
battle over the CDA, the government may now attempt to win the war over
Internet speech regulation by attempting to limit Reno to its facts-i.e., by
treating the decision as an inevitable response to ineptly drafted and poorly
executed legislation. The Reno Court left its decision vulnerable to this tactic,
because although the style and tone of the Reno majority opinion is very
speech-favorable, the substance of the opinion stops short of describing how the
Court fits the Internet into the complex web of First Amendment doctrine. For
constitutional purposes, Reno tells us what the Internet is not-it is not
broadcasting; but despite all the Court's overtures to unfettered expression over
the Internet, we still do not know what the Internet is. This is very problematic
in a First Amendment universe that depends increasingly on placing new forms
of speech in conceptual pigeonholes to determine whether and how much that
speech is protected by the Constitution.
The application of the public forum doctrine to the Internet provides a way
out of this dilemma by encasing Reno in a conceptual framework that would
link the opinion to the Court's existing doctrine and prevent future efforts to
limit the spirit of Reno by tying it to the facts of the failed CDA. Moreover, as
noted in Part V.A., supra, the characterization of the Internet as a public forum
is consistent with the imagery and precedents used by the Court itself to justify
its decision in Reno.
It is not surprising that Justice Stevens cited several public forum decisions
when he wrote the Reno majority opinion. The Internet can be considered the
operational definition of what Justice Kennedy has called a "metaphysical"
public forum. 370 Although the Internet has no physical presence in one place (it
is, rather, an interconnected network of computers spread throughout the
world), it operates as a centralized place where people go to discuss issues,
trade information, and peruse words, images, and music. The Internet is,
therefore, a forum. Moreover, this particular forum was created by the
369 See the Court's description of the legislative history in Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2338-39
& n.24.
370 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
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government (it originated in the Advanced Research Project Agency in 1969371)
and was financed through much of its development by the National Science
Foundation. 372 Private companies have now taken over the government's role
in providing funds and the actual communications backbone for the Internet,
but the essentially public character of the system is the same: from the
perspective of speakers, listeners, and viewers, the privatized Internet remains
like a public park-the most traditional of traditional public forums-a place
where anyone can enter at any time of day and speak on any subject that comes
to mind to anyone willing to listen. There are no "no trespassing" signs on the
Internet. Therefore, whenever the government intervenes to suppress, limit, or
channel communications over the Internet, either through regulation of private
speech or by limiting access to the Internet over publicly-available access points
provided by the government, any restrictions on speech should be governed by
the rules of the public forum set forth in the previous sections of this Article.
373
37 1 See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATrHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE:
THE OiGnis oF THE INTERNEr 103-36 (1996).
372 See generally id. at 240-46.
373 Because I limit my focus here to direct efforts by the government to regulate the
Internet, the state action problem does not arise. However, the clear-cut nature of the Internet
as a publicly accessible instrumentality of communication does have implications for the
application of First Amendment rules to private Internet Service Providers (ISP's) who
engage in content-based restrictions on access to certain portions of the Internet. The most
notorious instances of censorship by private ISP's are Compuserve's brief effort to block 200
sex-related Internet sites, and America Online's preemptive strike prior to the passage of the
CDA, when America Online decided to censor the word "breast" from its system. The latter
effort led to the suppression of discussion groups concerning breast cancer and other women's
issues, and was soon abandoned. See Peter H. Lewis, An On-Line Service Halts Restriction
on Sex Material, N.Y. TrIm, Feb. 14, 1996, at Al; Peter H. Lewis, Personal Computers:
About Freedom of the Virtual Press, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1996, at B14. Other recent
examples include the successful efforts of America Online and Compuserve to block all
unsolicited e-mail advertisements from another company's customers. See Compuserve, Inc.
v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ohio 1997) (issuing preliminary
injunction against e-mail advertisements on theory that advertisements constitute a trespass on
the property of Compuserve, and are unprotected by the First Amendment); Cyber
Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding
that "private online service has the right to prevent unsolicited e-mail solicitations from
reaching its subscribers over the Internet").
The existing First Amendment rules regarding the constitutional protection of free speech
on private property were developed in the context of picketing at private shopping centers.
See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
Those cases depended on the Court's assumption that speech at a shopping center is
incompatible with the designated purposes of the private property. According to the Court in
those cases, the First Amendment claim "misapprehends the scope of the invitation extended
to the public. The invitation is to come to the Center to do business with the
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The following problems indicate how the public forum designation will affect
government regulation of the Internet in three typical situations.
1. Problem One: "Zoning" the Internet to Limit Sexual Speech
In contrast to the Reno majority's diffuse conceptualization of the Internet,
Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Reno offers a pointed vision of what the
Internet is and how it fits into the fabric of modem First Amendment
jurisprudence. According to Justice O'Connor, regulation of the Internet
through statutes such as the CDA amounts to "little more than an attempt by
Congress to create 'adult zones' on the Internet." 374 She argues that
government regulations limiting access to sexually explicit speech on the
Internet are nothing more than "zoning laws." 375 By describing Internet
regulation as an exercise in zoning, O'Connor locates the Internet in an area of
First Amendment jurisprudence whose rules have tended to favor very broad
governmental restrictions on speech. O'Connor notes that the Court has
previously upheld several such laws in what she calls the "physical world." 376
She also notes that although the present differences between the physical world
tenants.... There is no open-ended invitation to the public to use the Center for any and all
purposes, however incompatible with the interests of both the stores and the shoppers whom
they serve." Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 564-65. But in the case of a private company offering
members of the public general access to the Internet, the "property" (that is, the ISP's servers
that link the customer to the Internet) is not dedicated to a purpose other than speech. Speech
is the purpose of this particular type of private property, and if (as I argue in this section)
speech on the Internet takes place in a public forum, then a private ISP that provides public
access to the Internet should be obligated to follow the rules that define that forum. In other
words, the private ISP must permit its customers to have access to all speech in the forum,
regardless of what the operators of the ISP think about the content of that speech. As
compensation for giving up control over what their customers may access over the Internet,
this mandatory access rule would insulate the ISP's from civil liability for tortious speech
distributed over their system. Compare Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that Compuserve cannot be held liable for defamation distributed
over its electronic library because service was mere "distributor" of information and did not
exercise editorial discretion over content), with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding that Prodigy could be held
liable for defamation because it held itself out as exercising control over the content of speech
accessible by its customers). See also Zeran v. America Online, 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D.
Va. 1997) (holding that Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act-which was
not challenged in Reno-preempts state-law negligence liability claims against Internet service
provider).
374 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
375 Id.
376 Id. at 2353.
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and cyberspace make the analogy between the two worlds incomplete, this
situation may change soon through the increased use of "gateway technology,"
such as uniform Web site ratings and the use of adult information numbers to
access sites with sexual images.377
According to O'Connor, the ability to construct barriers in cyberspace
through the use of these new technologies (which she concedes are still too
porous to justify the criminal provisions of the CDA), "make[s] cyberspace
more like the physical world and, consequently, more amenable to zoning
laws." 378 Although the Reno majority did not adopt O'Connor's zoning
rationale, Justice Stevens seemed to have something similar in mind when he
noted that Congress should have considered regulatory measures more limited
than the CDA, such as the possibility of "requiring that indecent material be
'tagged' in a way that facilitates parental control of material coming into their
homes. "379
Comments such as these raise the specter of a new generation of "baby-
CDA's," such as a government mandate that Internet browser software include
an Internet equivalent to the V-chip technology that manufacturers will soon be
required to install in all new television sets.380 This technology, in turn, would
require some form of uniform ratings system for all Web sites. Whether
government requirements of blocking technology or ratings could withstand a
First Amendment challenge may ultimately depend on the government's ability
to convince the Court to apply Justice O'Connor's zoning theory to this type of
Internet regulation. 381
Despite the superficial similarities between the Court's zoning cases and
similar efforts to restrict access to sexual material on the Internet, O'Connor's
377 Id. at 2353-54.
37 8 Id. at 2353.
379 Id. at 2348.
380 See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 139-142 (Feb. 8, 1996) (requiring V-chip to
block sexually explicit or violent programming).
381 In the wake of the Reno decision, the Clinton Administration has presently chosen to
emphasize voluntary measures (such as the use of currently available programs to block
sexually explicit Web sites) rather than new government mandates. See John M. Broder, Let
It Be: Ira Magaziner Argues for Minimal Intemet Regulaton, N.Y. Trms, June 30, 1997, at
D1 (discussing White House task force recommendations). However, Senator Dan Coats,
who sponsored the CDA, announced that he would "put the force of law" behind Internet
industry efforts to promote child-protection software. Elizabeth Corcoran, Clinton Vows to
Work on Web Smut Safeguards, WAsH. PosT, July 17, 1997, at C3. In November, 1997,
Coats introduced a bill requiring anyone "engaged in the business of the commercial
distribution of material that is harmful to minors [to] restrict access to such material by
persons under 17 years of age." Criminal fines and prison sentences of up to six months
would be imposed on violators. See S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1997).
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analogy between zoning in the physical world and "zoning" in cyberspace
breaks down quickly. First, although O'Connor repeatedly refers to her theory
as a "zoning" rationale, she does not even cite the Court's major previous
decisions upholding zoning regulations aimed at sexual speech, such as Young
v. American Mini Theaters382 or Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.383 These
cases have upheld zoning regulations that isolate adult cinemas, nude dancing
establishments, and adult bookstores in particular areas of a town, away from
residential areas, churches, and schools. One glance at the Court's rationale in
these cases underscores the inapplicability of the zoning concept to the Internet.
The First Amendment challenge to the zoning statutes in cases like Young
and Renton revolved around the fact that the zoning statutes in those cases
treated parcels of property differently based on the particular type of speech that
took place within the property; 384 thus, the statutes appeared to discriminate on
the basis of content against property used by those engaging in non-obscene
(and therefore constitutionally protected) sexual speech. The Court rejected the
First Amendment claims in the zoning cases after concluding that the
regulations were not primarily concerned with the content of speech, but rather
were responses to "the secondary effects of adult theaters. "385 According to the
Court, the zoning regulations did not constitute attempts to suppress or restrict
speech, but rather reflected the community's desire to "prevent crime, protect
the city's retail trade, maintain property values," and preserve the character of
particular neighborhoods. 386
The Court's content-neutral explanation of the government's intent in the
zoning cases was somewhat ingenuous in light of the clear focus on the content
of speech in the facts surrounding the adoption of the legislation in question,387
but the secondary effects rationale is the Court's official explanation for
upholding what would otherwise be impermissible content-based zoning
regulations, and that explanation sets clear limits on the extent to which the
zoning theory can be extended to other areas. This is a problem for Justice
O'Connor because the "secondary effects" explanation does not apply at all to
the Internet. Speech taking place on the Internet has no outward manifestation
equivalent to a graphic or offensive marquee outside an adult theater. Likewise,
it is not possible for groups of unsavory characters to hang around on a street
382 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
383 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
384 See Young, 427 U.S. at 52-53 (describing zoning statutes); Renton, 475 U.S. at 44
(describing zoning statutes).
385 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
386 Id. at 48.
387 See id. at 59-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recounting flimsy evidence supporting
"secondary effects" rationale in legislative findings supporting zoning statute).
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corner outside a Web site containing sexual expression, and no Web site will
lower the property values of an adjacent site. The absence of any plausible
concern over crime or property values indicates that the Court's secondary
effects rationale for upholding zoning restrictions of indecent speech is
inapplicable in the Internet context.
Perhaps the difficulty of extending the secondary effects rationale to the
Internet explains why Justice O'Connor ignored the Court's own zoning cases
in developing her zoning theory of Internet regulation. Nevertheless, the cases
she did muster for support are no more helpful to her cause. 388 The decision on
which O'Connor relied most heavily to support her zoning rationale is not a
zoning case at all. This case-Ginsberg v. New York389-upheld a state statute
prohibiting minors from purchasing magazines that the state deemed "harmful
to minors." 39° O'Connor argued that the CDA is akin to the law upheld in
Ginsberg. Thus, she voted to uphold the CDA as written where the law could
be "applied to a conversation involving only an adult and one or more
minors," 391 and strongly suggested that she would uphold a future version of
the CDA once gateway technology makes it possible to "zone" the Internet in a
way that preserves adults' access to sexually explicit material on the Internet
that is inappropriate for children (in the same way that children were "zoned"
out of adult bookstores by the law upheld in Ginsberg).
Even if Ginsberg can be construed as a zoning case, however, it is no more
applicable to the Internet than the Court's more traditional zoning decisions.
The difference between Ginsberg and the Internet is that in Ginsberg a
"gateway" mechanism was already in place to enforce the state's statute without
altering the nature of the forum in question-i.e., the clerks in stores that sold
adult magazines. Therefore, the restriction on sales of sexual materials to
minors that the Court upheld in Ginsberg would not fundamentally alter the
388 With two exceptions, the relevant First Amendment decisions cited by O'Connor all
held that attempts to regulate sexual speech were unconstitutional. See Sable Communications
of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (striking down federal regulation of dial-a-
por services); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (striking down
federal law prohibiting mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives); Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975) (striking down local ordinance prohibiting drive-in
theaters from showing films containing nudity); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 384
(1957) (striking down Michigan statute prohibiting sale to public of any material not fit for
children). The only two cases cited by O'Connor that upheld regulations of speech were
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (discussed in text infra) and Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1954) (pre-Miller case upholding regulation of obscenity). None of
these cases involved zoning regulations.
389 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
390Id. at 638.
391Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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basic characteristics of the forum, or inhibit the dissemination of speech in that
forum. On the Internet, on the other hand, a similar "zoning" regulation would
require basic alterations to the open geography of cyberspace. The interposition
of mandatory gatekeeping mechanisms at various points on the Internet would
fundamentally change the open nature of the forum and severely hamper the
quick, simple, and cheap dissemination of speech through the medium.
Judge Dalzell's structural criticism of the CDA in the lower court's Reno
decision relates to this point and applies also to more limited attempts to "zone"
the Internet: "Because it would necessarily affect the Internet itself, . . . [such
regulations] would necessarily reduce the speech available for adults on the
medium. ' '392 It is impossible to predict the exact nature of the changes that
would occur in response to the "zoning" of the Internet. But it is inevitable that
a zoning scheme at least to some extent would close or fracture the uniform and
open framework presently characterizing the medium. Once this change occurs,
much of the Internet's promise as an instrumentality of communication will be
lost forever.
Treating the Internet as a public forum avoids these dangers and is more
consistent with both the structure of the Internet and the constitutional tradition
of open, even raucous and offensive expression in public forums. The relevant
precedents are not the zoning cases and Ginsberg, but rather Cohen v.
California393 and Erznoznik v. Jacksonville.394 Although neither case is
technically a public forum case, each decision describes the spirit of unfettered
public expression that characterizes existing public spaces in this society-a
spirit that permeates the Internet. In Cohen, which overturned the conviction of
a man for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a public
place, the Court emphasized that the First Amendment was intended to
"remove governmental restraints form the arena of public discussion," even if
this freedom from restraint results in "verbal tumult, discord, and even
offensive utterance." 395 In Erznoznik, which overturned a local ordinance
prohibiting drive-in theaters from showing films containing nudity, the Court
likewise emphasized that citizens of a modem democracy will be faced daily
with "constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression." 396 In
such an atmosphere, "[m]uch that we encounter [will offend] our esthetic, if not
our political and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not
permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are
392 Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Dalzell, J.).
393 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
394 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
395 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25.
396 ErznoZni, 422 U.S. at 210.
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sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or
viewer." 397 Both cases rely on the basic proposition that unwilling viewers'
central remedy for offensive speech in public is to "avoid further bombardment
of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." 398 This is the only remedy
that is compatible with the basic nature of all public forums. Both Cohen and
Erznoznik note that the government may limit unwanted intrusions into the
home. But by refusing to apply the Pacifica-type "intrusiveness" arguments to
the Internet, the Supreme Court has already definitively determined that the
Internet is a public space, not an intruder into the private space of the home.
The application of the public forum doctrine to the Internet would underscore
the functional similarities between the physical and the metaphysical public
forums. Therefore, offensive speech on the Internet is entitled to at least as
much protection as that provided in cases such as Cohen and Erznoznik, and if
the nature of the medium is to be preserved, Judge Dalzell's conclusion is
inevitable: "Congress may not regulate indecency on the Internet at all." 399
2. Problem Two: Regulation of Nonsexual Speech on the Internet
Most regulations of speech on the Internet to date have involved
government limitations on the dissemination of sexual speech, but regulation of
nonsexual speech is also proliferating. Examples of nonsexual speech regulation
include a Georgia statute prohibiting Internet users from using any name to
"falsely identify" themselves online,40 a Connecticut statute prohibiting
communication over a computer network "in a manner likely to cause
annoyance or alarm" if the speaker intends to "harass, annoy, or alarm," 401 a
federal statute proposed by Senator Diane Feinstein prohibiting the
dissemination of bomb-making information over the Internet,4°2 and proposals
397Id.
398 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
399 Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 877 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Dalzell, J.)
400 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (1997). A federal district court has issued a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of this statute, holding that the statute is overbroad,
unconstitutionally vague, and an impermissible content-based regulation of speech. See
ACLU v. Miller, No. 1:96-cv-2475-MHS (N.D. Ga. Order filed June 20, 1997), reprinted at
< http://www.aclu.org/court/aclugavmiler.html >.
401 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183(a)(2) (1997).
402 The proposed legislation would make it a federal criminal offense to "distribute to
any person, by any means, information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or
use of an explosive, destructive device, or weapon of mass destruction, knowing that such
person intends to use the... information... in furtherance of an activity that constitutes a
Federal criminal offense or a State or local criminal offense affecting interstate commerce."
143 CONG. REc. S5989 (daily ed. June 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). The Feinstein
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by various private groups to prohibit hate speech on the Intemet. 40 3 These
regulations and proposed regulations target different types of speech, but two
factors unify the otherwise disparate attempts to regulate nonsexual
communication over the Internet. First, each of the examples listed above
involves speech that is generally assumed to be constitutionally protected when
it is published or spoken outside the context of the Internet. For example, the
Court has twice held that the First Amendment provides a right to speak and
assemble anonymously. 4°4 Likewise, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that speech that merely "annoys or alarms" listeners cannot be punished by the
government.4° 5 The Court has also foreclosed the regulation of hate speech per
proposal was added to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, and was
adopted by the Senate by a vote of 94-0. 143 CONG. REc. S6006 (daily ed. June 19, 1997). In
support of her proposal, Senator Feinstein recounted her discovery of a text entitled "The
Terrorist's Handbook," which she had her staff download from the Internet. 143 CONG. REC.
S5990 (daily ed. June 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). According to Senator
Feinstein's view of her legislation, anyone posting on their Web site the text of this book, or
others like it, would be criminally liable for any action by any person using the information
contained in the book. "[I]t is my belief that the person who puts this up on the Internet
becomes a conspirator in the ability to commit a major crime in the United States." 143
CONG. REc. S5990 (daily ed. June 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
The Feinstein proposal, which prohibits the distribution of bomb-making information "in
whole or in part," is phrased broadly enough to potentially criminalize even the posting of a
link to another Web site that contains the prohibited information. Such a prosecution has
already occurred in Germany. The German government prosecuted the left-wing political
activist Angela Marquardt for placing on her personal Web site a link to the Dutch Internet
site of the German underground journal 'Radikal," which has published articles on how to
make bombs and derail trains. See Edmund L. Andrews, Germany's Efforts to Police Web
Are Upsetting Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at Al. A German judge later held Ms.
Marquardt not guilty on the narrow ground that she had established her link to the "Radikal"
site before the journal had published the offending articles on bombs and trains. See Edmund
L. Andrews, German Judge Dismisses Criminal Charge Over Internet Link, N.Y. Tuma,
July 1, 1997, at D7.
403 The most prominent proponent of this type of regulation is the Simon Weisenthal
Center, which has urged access providers and universities to censor messages that "promote
racism, anti-Semitism, mayhem and violence." Peter H. Lewis, Group Urges an Internet Ban
On Hate Groups' Messages, N.Y. Trams, Jan. 10, 1996, at A10.
404 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) ("Under our
Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an
honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent."); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459
(1958) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited Alabama from forcing the NAACP to
reveal its membership lists).
405 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989) (overturning conviction for burning
American flag under state statute prohibiting desecration of flag "in a way that the actor
knows will seriously offend" observers) (citing Tax. PENAL. CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (West
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se, in the absence of any proof that the speech threatens to cause an immediate
breach of tlie peace.40 6 Finally, although the Supreme Court has never
specifically held that publishing bomb-making information is protected by the
First Amendment, in the modem era of First Amendment jurisprudence, the
Court has adhered to the principle that "if the state is only concerned about
printed or filmed materials inducing antisocial conduct, we believe that in the
context of private consumption of ideas and information we should adhere to
the view that '[a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to
prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law." ' 40 7
1989)); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518 (1972) (overturning conviction under statute
prohibiting use of "opprobrious words or abusive language"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 15 (1971) (overturning conviction applying statute prohibiting "offensive conduct" to
actions of individual wearing jacket with inscription "Fuck the Draft"); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 1 (1949) (overturning conviction for speech under a statute prohibiting
speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, [or] brings about a condition of
unrest").
406 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
407 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969) (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). In Stanley, Justice Marshall continues
by noting that "[gliven the present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere
possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may
prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of
homemade spirits." Id. at 567. Presumably the same principle would apply to a statute that
prohibits possession of chemistry information derived from the Internet on the theory that
such information would lead to homemade bombs.
In its review of the Senator Feinstein's proposed statute prohibiting dissemination of
bomb-making information, the Justice Department itself noted that "[t]he First Amendment
would impose substantial constraints on any attempt to proscribe indiscriminately the
dissemination of bombmaking information. The government generally may not, except in rare
circumstances, punish persons either for advocating lawless action or for disseminating
truthful information-including information that would be dangerous if used-that such
persons have obtained lawfully." DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT ON TBE
AvbnABn =Y OF BOMBMAKNG INFORMATION, THn ExTET TO WHICH ITs DISSEMINATON IS
CoNTRoLLm BY FEDERAL LAW, AND Tr ExTE TO WHIcH SucH DISSEMINA1TON MAY BE
Sumcr TO REGULATION CONSSTENT WrrH TiHE Frsr AmENDrmEr TO THE U.S.
CONSTrTUTION, reprinted at 143 CONG. REC. S5991 (daily ed. June 19, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein). The Justice Department satisfied itself that the Feinstein proposal
nevertheless could withstand constitutional scrutiny because of language added to the statute to
link the publication to some criminal conspiracy, but Senator Feinstein's statements on the
floor of the Senate interpreted the "conspiracy" element of the statute so broadly as to
encompass anyone publishing the information: "Mr. President, there is no legal, legitimate
use for a phone bomb, for a book bomb, for a baby-food bomb, all of which are described in
this handbook. When it is put in this context, the context of criminality, it is my belief that the
person who puts this up on the Internet becomes a conspirator in the ability to commit a major
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The second factor that characterizes all the recent attempts to regulate
nonsexual speech on the Internet is that they are all motivated by a generalized
fear of the medium itself. Each of the statutes or proposals cited at the
beginning of this subsection seem to be premised on the general sense that
dangerous speech is somehow rendered more dangerous because of its
appearance on the Internet.40 8 Perhaps this fear of the Internet is merely a
response to the often slick and graphic presentation of otherwise unsavory
information on many Web sites, or perhaps it is a response to the ease with
which the Internet allows anyone to access any information from anywhere in
the country (or the world) without the knowledge or supervision of the
authorities. In any event, the efforts to restrict the dissemination of antisocial
ideas and dangerous information has taken on new urgency with the growth of
the Internet.
However well motivated these regulatory attempts may be, they all reflect a
paternalistic mindset that is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic thrust of
the First Amendment. The nonsexual speech regulations noted above share this
characteristic with the underlying premise of the CDA. The proponents of all
these regulations do not dispute that the Internet is an instrumentality of public
communication; rather, they operate on the assumption that the Internet is too
efficient at facilitating communication that the government does not like. As
Judge Dalzell noted regarding the government's defense of the CDA, "the
Government's asserted 'failure' of the Internet rests on the implicit premise that
too much speech occurs in that medium, and that speech there is too available
to the participants."409 As Judge Dalzell also noted, the concept of "too much
speech" and the notion that information is "too available" are both "profoundly
repugnant to First Amendment principles. 410
Declaring the Internet a public forum is a response to the fear of "too much
speech" on the Internet, and would provide an important reinforcement for
existing constitutional protections of social and political dissenters-who are the
primary targets of all the statutes cited above. The public forum doctrine began
as a way of democratizing speech by providing a communicative avenue for
crime in the United States." 143 CONG. REc. S5990 (daily ed. June 19, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein).
408 Senator Feinstein's defense of her statute provides an explicit expression of this fear.
According to Senator Feinstein: "[W]e know that materials on the Internet are used by
terrorists to commit terrorist acts. We also know that the number of explosive devices now
being found are increasing. Authorities have stated that the rise is attributable to a rise in
Internet use." 143 CONG. Rac. S5990 (daily ed. June 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
409 Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Dalzell, J.).
410 Id.
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speakers who lack the resources to publish their views in the more traditional
form of a newspaper or magazine. The Jnternet follows in this tradition.
Declaring the Internet a public forum would extend to the new forum the same
protections already offered in other public spaces for offensive or antisocial
speech. It would also serve as a reminder that public speech-which includes
speech disseminated to the public via the Internet-is protected up to the point
that the speech acts as a direct incitement to immediate illegal action. The
standard for potentially dangerous speech over the Internet should be no
different than the standard for speech on a sidewalk or in a public
auditorium.411 The Court has long prevented the government from punishing
public speakers based on the government's nonspecific fear of public
disturbance; 412 if anything, the absence of physical proximity between speaker
and listener makes it even less likely that speech over the Internet can pose the
kind of immediate dangers to public order that the government legitimately may
address. On the Internet, as in other public spaces, therefore, the operative
axiom should be that "political speech by its nature will sometimes have
unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our society accords greater weight
to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse." 413
3. Problem Three: Limitations on Access to the Internet Through
Publicly Owned Facilities
The third Internet regulation problem implicating the public forum doctrine
arises whenever the government attempts to limit access to the Internet through
public computers. This problem arises in two contexts. The first context
involves public universities that attempt to impose limits on faculty and student
use of university-owned servers and personal computers. Most of the recent
controversies over restrictions on student use of university computers have
involved disputes over institutional limits on the viewing or dissemination of
411 For examples of how protective the First Amendment can be of antagonistic speech
in public places, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913-15 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973).
412 This principle appears in the political speech cases, see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 420 (1989), the hostile audience cases, see, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 4 (1949), and the fighting words cases, see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524
(1972)-all of which apply the same high level of constitutional protection of controversial
speech in public places.
413 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citing Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919)).
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sexual and political speech over the Internet.414 Most of these disputes have
occurred at private universities, and so have not produced judicial opinions
delving into the First Amendment implications of those restrictions. The few
published judicial decisions involving public universities have either been
decided through the application of very specialized First Amendment rules,415
or have generated skimpy and unenlightening general discussions of the
relevant constitutional doctrine.416 The second context in which these issues
have arisen involves public libraries, some of which have responded to local
political pressure by limiting their patrons' access to controversial sites on the
Internet.417 None of these cases has yet been litigated.
414Two prominent examples involve Ivy League universities. Comel University
recently sanctioned four students for using their university computer accounts to send a
private e-mail message entitled "75 reasons why women should not have free speech," which
was then reposted on the Internet by persons other than the students. Penalffes Decided in E-
Mail at Cornell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at B8. In 1996, Princeton University issued a
broad statement prohibiting the use of its computer system for any political or commercial
purpose, then clarified the policy to permit political discussions by students and faculty. See
Karen DeMasters, Princeton Clarifies Policy on Electronic Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 1996, at Sec. 13NJ, p.5.
415 'Me most notorious is the Jake Baker case. In this case, the United States Attorney
prosecuted a University of Michigan student for posting on Usenet discussion groups a story
in which he depicted the rape, torture, and mutilation of a student with the identical name of
one of his classmates. The indictment was later dismissed by the federal courts on the ground
that the story did not constitute a "true threat." United States v. Allabaz, 104 F.3d 1492,
1493 (6th Cir. 1997).
4 16 See Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997). This decision is
apparently the only reported opinion involving a challenge to a public university's rules
limiting student and faculty access to the Internet with university computers. The court ruled
that the university president's unilateral decision to block access to a number of newsgroups
through university computers was not a violation of the First Amendment, despite the fact that
the university conceded that it had acted without extensive investigation of the blocked
newsgroups, and that many of the blocked newsgroups did not contain illegal obscene
material. The court based its decision in part on its conclusion that the university computers
did not constitute a public forum. See id. at 955. The court's discussion of this conclusion is
contained in a single paragraph. See id.
417 The Orlando, Florida public library has taken the most drastic steps to limit its
patrons' access to speech on the Internet, by purchasing and installing on all its public
computers the commercial filtering software "Websense." Lisa Brownlee, On-Line Porn
Sorely Tests Librarians' Free-Speech Principles, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997, at B1. The
Austin, Texas library has temporarily installed similar software pending the adoption of a
formal policy on the subject. See id. The Boston public library has taken a compromise
approach by installing filtering software on 26 computers designated for use by children and
leaving the remaining 44 machines free of limits. See Greeta Anand, Library Restricts Some
'Net Access, BosToN GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1997, at B2. Some libraries have refused to censor
access to the Internet at all. The public libraries in Los Angeles, Madison, Wisconsin, and
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Limitations on access to the Internet through public computers raise issues
similar to the public subsidy problem discussed in Part IV, supra.418 The
computers at public universities and libraries are government property, and
under current doctrine the use of these machines by private individuals could
easily be treated as yet another form of publicly subsidized speech. As noted in
Part IV, the application of current rules governing subsidized speech could
make it very difficult to challenge the government's self-imposed restrictions on
the public's use of its hardware. 419 But in this context, even more so than with
regard to the more typical forms of public subsidy of speech, the public forum
doctrine provides a more logical and coherent framework for analyzing the
state's interests in limiting the speech that can be sent and received from
government computers. Unlike current doctrine, the application of public forum
principles would in most cases tend to invalidate limits on the expressive use of
public computers.
When the government purchases a computer for public use at a university
or public library, the government is essentially providing the public an entrance
to an existing forum in which ongoing public discussions address the entire
range of human interests. The decision to provide access to the Internet through
public computer terminals is therefore the functional equivalent of a
government decision to provide access to a park, municipal auditorium, or any
other public area where communication regularly takes place. Having provided
this access to a preexisting public forum, the government must obey the
command of the First Amendment to permit all speakers to say what they want
to whoever is willing to listen. This should be the result even under current
public forum doctrine, which emphasizes the government's intent in creating a
public forum. 420
New York City have refused to install filtering software. See Roy Rivenburg, What They're
Checking Out at Libraries, Los ANGELEs TWMs, July 1, 1997, at El. The libraries that install
filtering software apparently violate the American Library Association's Library Bill of
Rights, the official interpretation of which states: "Libraries and librarians should not deny or
limit access to information available via electronic resources because of its allegedly
controversial content or because of the librarian's personal beliefs or fear of confrontation.
Information retrieved or utilized electronically should be considered constitutionally protected
unless determined otherwise by a court with appropriate jurisdiction." American Library
Association, Access to Electronic Informnation, Services, and Networks: An Interpretation of
the Library Bill of Rights (adopted Jan. 24, 1996) (< gopher://alal.ala.org:70/00/alagophx/ala
gophxfreedomelectacc.fin>).
418 See supra notes 294-332 and accompanying text.
419 See description of current doctrine supra notes 297-306 and accompanying text.
420 See supra notes 55-98 and accompanying text.
1998]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The nature of the Internet is not a mystery; the government should be on
notice that when it allows the public to join ongoing discussions in cyberspace,
the government has forsaken the authority to sanitize the forum to fit particular
political or social sensitivities. The version of the public forum doctrine
proposed in this Article goes one step beyond current doctrine to suggest that
the government's intent is subordinate to the nature of the forum in question.
With regard to the Internet, the nature of the forum in question is defined by the
absence of limits on speech it contains. Therefore, the same rationale that
prohibits the government from restricting offensive speech in a park (the nature
of which also is defined by unfettered speech) likewise should limit the
government's authority to sanitize the speech that its citizens access through the
Internet. Although the government may limit its own involvement in this
discussion (for example, by prohibiting its employees from using government
computers to represent the government's position on a controversial issue in an
Internet forum or Web site), the government should not be permitted to limit
the participation of citizens who are invited as independent individuals to use
government facilities to participate in the forum.
In the most basic sense, public libraries, universities, and the Internet serve
exactly the same purpose: to gather together as much information as possible at
one easily accessible point, and disseminate that information through ongoing
discussions among individuals interested in the subject. On the Internet, as in a
university or public library, the open exchange of information and opinions is
encouraged because it is essential to the success of the enterprise. Moreover,
there is a self-regulating mechanism built into the Internet-individual choice.
Just as an individual can choose to walk away from a discussion in a traditional
park, anyone can sit at a computer terminal and observe or listen to a speaker
over the Internet, or can move to another site if the listener finds the speaker's
opinions uninteresting, offensive, or wrong. The Internet truly puts "the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of
us," 421 which obviates the need for direct governmental control.
Under the test proposed here, the government has no legitimate interest in
limiting access to the Internet over publicly-accessible computers in universities
and public libraries unless the failure to do so would substantially interfere with
the government's ability to carry out its duties. Everyone agrees that some of
the government's legitimate duties will involve the regulation of speech. No one
disputes, for example, that the government has the authority to punish the
transmission of pirated audio recordings or the distribution of pictures
containing explicit visual images of children engaged in sexual acts. If an
example of speech is unprotected when placed on a bookshelf, or when it takes
421 Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Dalzell, J.)
(quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 449 (1991)).
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place in a park, it does not become legal merely because the same speech is
transmitted over a computer network.422 Therefore, a university or public
library should have the authority to prevent those using computers owned by
those institutions to copy unlicensed copyrighted materials or child
pornography. Likewise, no one disputes that the government may impose limits
on the use of a public forum (including parks as well as computers) to prevent
one speaker from monopolizing an asset that belongs to the entire community.
Therefore, universities and public libraries may impose time limits on computer
usage if scarce resources make such limits necessary to give all potential users
access to the forum.
Unfortunately, the government is seldom satisfied with this narrow
authority. In the cases discussed in this section, the government has
demonstrated its unwillingness to limit its regulatory efforts to finding and
punishing illegal speech, or protecting access to a limited communicative asset.
Rather, in the short time since the Internet was developed, local, state, and
federal governments have frequently sought to use their power to prohibit or
discourage access to speech whose content is protected by the Constitution. The
public forum doctrine denies the government this authority in its dealings with
the Internet, just as the doctrine denies the government similar authority in
other "new forums." Under the public forum analysis proposed here, as long as
unrestricted access to the Internet does not significantly interfere with the
government's ability to enforce constitutionally acceptable legal prohibitions on
unprotected speech, the government may not use either its regulatory authority
or its control over publicly-accessible government property to restrict access to
speech the government does not like.
422 The ease with which speech can be transmitted from place to place over the Internet
may, however, require limiting the scope of some criminal laws. For example, it is open to
question whether the "local community standards" analysis applicable to the first two
components of the First Amendment obscenity test make sense in a world where there are few
remaining barriers to open and immediate communication between every community
throughout the country. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973) (applying "local
community standards" to analyze whether sexual speech appeals to "prurient interest" and
whether speech describes specific sexual activities in a "patently offensive way"); see also
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (holding that state may allow jury to determine
for itself the parameters of the relevant local community). The universal accessibility of
speech over the Internet, and the unifying tendencies of developments in communications
technology generally, undermine the notion of isolated "local community values." These
developments suggest that the first two parts of the obscenity test should be judged by the
same national standard that now is used in applying the third component of that test, which is
used to analyze whether particular expression has serious literary, artistic, or political value.
See Pope v. Dinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite all the recent changes in the nature of public discourse, the public
forum doctrine remains at the core of the First Amendment. Symbolically and
functionally, the protection of free expression demands that the courts
frequently recall the quaint central image of the public forum: a raucous orator
on a street comer thumbing his nose at the King's policemen, who look on in
powerless frustration because the law prohibits them from silencing the
dissident. But the image is not enough to protect speech in the new era of
virtual forums and dispersed, untraditional public spaces. The image and the
doctrine it produced must be updated for the new era to ensure that the new
forums serve the same democratizing purpose as the old.
I have suggested that the existing public forum doctrine is inadequate in
three major respects: First, because it limits the key reference point of the
traditional public forum to antiquated public spaces that have a decreasing
impact on the everyday communicative lives of modem citizens. Second,
because the Supreme Court has created a mutated middle category of "limited"
public forums that are defined tautologically in terms of the government's intent
as to whether speech may take place in the forum. And third, with the
exception of the Rosenberger decision, the Court has been reluctant to extend
the application of the public forum doctrine beyond the context of physical
forums-which limits the doctrine's usefulness in an era when an increasing
proportion of public debate occurs electronically between conversants who are
separated geographically by great distances.
The changes proposed here would cure these defects by replacing the
current three-tier public forum doctrine with a simpler two-tier system, in
which the government would be permitted to regulate speech in both traditional
and nontraditional public forums only if the speech would otherwise
significantly interfere with the government's ability to carry out its legitimate
duties. Rigorous enforcement of this interference standard would stem the
current trend toward a narrowing of the public forum, especially if it is
combined with a creative application of the doctrine to what Justice Kennedy
terms "metaphysical forums," including government programs funding speech
and government regulation of the Internet.
The great democratic tradition of public discussion and debate cannot be
protected adequately unless the image of the public forum is updated to
conform with the realities of the new era in communication. But with the
incorporation of changes such as those suggested in this Article, a reinvigorated
public forum doctrine can preserve the legacy of history's eloquent street-
comer orators, even after the orators and their venerable mode of
communication have disappeared forever.
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